Pubdate: 01 Apr 2001 Source: Armed Forces Journal International (US) Page: 14 Copyright: 2001 Armed Forces Journal International Contact: http://www.afji.com/ Details: http://www.mapinc.org/media/895 Author: Marty Kauchak EYES IN THE SKY Forward Operating Bases Bolster US Counterdrug Operations Before the closure of Howard Air Force Base, Panama, in December 1999, the US military and the US Customs Service had used this site to operate airborne early warning, maritime patrol, and tracker aircraft in support of the nation's counterdrug operations in South America, the Caribbean, and the Eastern Pacific. To help offset the operational capabilities lost as a result of the Howard AFB closure, the Office of National Drug Control Policy asked the Department of Defense to develop a "post-Panama-presence" plan for supporting aircraft used in counterdrug missions. DoD's plan calls for the use of airfields-termed forward operating locations (FOLs)-by military and Customs Service aircraft at: Manta, Ecuador; Aruba; Curacao; and Comalapa Airport (San Salvador), El Salvador. All sites are expected to be fully operational by late 2002. Congressional Interest In a statement to AFJI from Senator Charles Grassley (R-IA), Chairman of the Caucus on International Narcotics Control, the senator recalled that he "was not very satisfied with the state of planning on finding sites for sustained aerial operations that preceded the closing of Howard AFB," nor was he pleased "with the level of DoD and State Department thinking on how much new sites would cost." Senator Grassley asked the Government Accounting Office (GAO) to conduct a survey of the [former Clinton] Administration's efforts to establish a forward operation location to support counterdrug missions in the source and transit zones, after the closing of Howard AFB. The senator indicated that he "wanted a baseline so Congress would have some basis to judge relative costs and some idea of what a comprehensive source and transit strategy would look like." Grassley noted that a December 2000 GAO report, "Drug Control: International Counterdrug Sites Being Developed," established that baseline. New Advantages The US appears ready to gain strategic and tactical advantages from establishing the four new FOLs. The December 2000 GAO report on the four FOLs stated: "Together, the four sites provide greater geographic coverage than did Howard Air Force Base, according to DoD officials. In particular, they provide deeper source zone coverage and extend coverage farther into the increasingly trafficked Eastern Pacific because of their proximity to the targeted zones." Stephen Lucas, public affairs public information officer at US Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), told AFJI that the Howard AFB closure and the transition to expeditionary operations in the unimproved FOLs at Curacao, Aruba, and Manta would cause a 15 percent decrease in the US force's ability to "cover" the source and primary transit zones in the Eastern Carribean and Eastern Pacific. He projected that as "infrastructure improvements continue and are completed at those FOLs-and a fourth site at Comalapa-that the eventual 'coverage' capability will exceed the capability we had at Howard AFB by a like amount." Lucas said some of the strategic and tactical out comes of the new FOLs will include: improving US coverage of the entire source zone and improved coverage of the Eastern Pacific and Caribbean transit zones; and increased loiter time-the time surveillance aircraft can spend in their patrol zones. One of the more dramatic examples of how air assets can influence the counterdrug mission in this region is described on the homepage of US Naval Forces Southern Command. One operational summary recounts how, in November of last year, a US military aircraft visually detected a small surface craft loaded with 60 to 65 bales of cocaine. The aircraft may have contributed to the boat operator's decision to throw the bales overboard when it became apparent he was unable to shake his pursuer. The estimated street value of the jettisoned cargo was set at $200 million. FOL Costs The GAO report on the four FOL sites estimates that infrastructure-improvement costs at all four sites will vary significantly-Manta ($61.3 million); Curacao ($43.9 million); Aruba ($10.2 million); and Comalapa ($9.3 million)-amounting to approximately $125 million. Lt. Col. George Rhynedance, spokesman in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), revised this amount upward to $137.8 million-due to emergent Fiscal Year 2002 construction requirements at Comalapa. Rhynedance told AFJI that DoD estimates that the annual operating costs for the four sites will be $38.4 million. At least 25 military personnel, augmented by civilian contractor support staff at Manta, will form the permanent US staff required to keep these sites fully operational. The US is expected to realize financial advantages from the relocation to the new FOLs. USSOUTHCOM spokesman Lucas indicated that the costs of preparing the FOLs for operations compare favorably with the cost of maintaining Howard AFB. He noted that in its last full year of operation, the base cost $75.8 million to operate and maintain. Lucas added: "Even if you add the cost of the initial infrastructure improvements at all four locations to their projected annual operating and maintenance costs, the American taxpayer is getting significantly more 'bang for the buck' from the network of access agreements which created the FOLs. This is especially true when you consider the fact that when the operations are in full swing, counterdrug agencies will actually have more capability than existed when operations were in Panama." Agreement Terms Under an interim agreement with the Netherlands, and permanent agreements with El Salvador and Ecuador, the US is authorized unrestricted airfield access only to conduct counterdrug detection and monitoring operations. Each agreement is for a 10-year period and, if both parties agree, the agreements may be renewed for five-year periods. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense spokesman Lt. Col. Rhynedance reiterated that the FOLs are not US bases. He noted that the host governments maintain sovereign control over the airports and the national airspace used by US forces. Additional host-nation control over these operations is exercised by embarking a country representative on a US aircraft whenever the aircraft overflies a nation's airspace. The representative serves as the communications link between the aircraft and national law enforcement authorities on the ground and in the air. Other important tenets of each agreement cited in the GAO report are: *The host-nation authorities have overall responsibility for air traffic control and the physical security of the airfield. *The US will maintain these facilities and provide physical security for its aircraft. *Airfield access is 24 hours a day, seven days a week. The Netherlands parliament is expected to next month to debate a permanent FOL agreement involving Curacao and Aruba. It is anticipated that other multi-national participants in counterdrug operations in the region will also use the FOLs. These participants include the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. Operational Constraints The GAO report on the FOLs briefly addresses operational constraints that US aircraft encounter as they operate from the new sites. The most significant constraint is the lack of overflight and pursuit agreements with regional nations. In Venezuela, the report points out: "The lack of an overflight agreement with Venezuela increases the transit time for US aircraft flying from Aruba and Curacao to the source region." The report also notes that the US does not have agreements with other nations, including Guatemala and Nicaragua. An official at Venezuela's embassy in Washington DC discussed with AFJI his country's position on signing an overflight and pursuit agreement with the US. The official said that Venezuela has been recognized for supporting counterdrug operations in the region, and that this one disagreement should not tarnish his country's image of wanting to reduce the flow and use of illegal drugs. The issue of overflights and pursuit of suspected aircraft by the US is considered a sensitive issue of national sovereignty-a position that remains unchanged through two consecutive governments, the official said. The Venezuelan official left open the door for further dialogue with the US on this issue, indicating that perhaps a compromise could be reached. He said that Venezuela's ground-based, air-surveillance/control radar infrastructure needs upgrading. He also indicated that if two conditions existed-if his country were to receive resources to improve its air radar network and if Venezuelan personnel were allowed to operate the network-that it may be possible to arrange to share information-that would allow the air network's information to support regional counterdrug operations. A US State Department source provided a generally upbeat assessment of the status of securing overflight agreements with other regional governments. The source reported that negotiations have been completed with Nicaragua and that an agreement is ready to be signed-following a final review by that government. An overflight arrangement involving the Turks and Caicos was completed last October under an agreement with the United Kingdom. It may be more difficult to achieve an agreement with Guatemala; the State Department source indicated that the US has approached that government several times without much success. Future overflight negotiations are planned with the French West Indies. The Road Ahead As democracies become more firmly entrenched in the Caribbean and Latin American regions, there will be more interest in addressing both the supply and demand sides of the global drug problem. The prospect that four robust FOLs will help to the US and her allies reduce the supply of drugs will boost a decades-old effort to attack the problem at its source. - --- MAP posted-by: Richard Lake