Pubdate: Thu, 31 May 2001 Source: Times of Central Asia (Kyrgyzstan) Copyright: 2001 The Times of Central Asia Contact: http://www.times.kg/ Details: http://www.mapinc.org/media/1202 Author: Gregory Gleason, EurasiaNet CENTRAL ASIAN "RAZBORKA:" FALLOUT FROM AFGHANISTAN'S OPIUM BAN Shock waves from a dramatic drop in Afghanistan's opium production are beginning to reverberate throughout Central Asia's drug trafficking networks. Street prices for heroin in Eurasian and European markets have remained stable, indicating that the cutback in opium supplies still has not hit drug consumers. But specialists in drug trafficking say that Afghanistan's ban on poppy cultivation can be expected to result in a drop in opium supplies and, consequently, to send prices for opium-based drugs skyrocketing in the year ahead. Central Asian drug traffickers are already reportedly engaged in what Russian Mafia bosses describe as a major "razborka"-- a weeding out of suppliers, transporters, and marketers in new, much fiercer market conditions. Russian border guards along the Tajik-Afghan border report that trafficking activity remains intense, according to the Interfax news agency. Border guards have confiscated over 150 kilograms of heroin and detained 15 suspected smugglers in May. Two border guards have been wounded in at least four clashes with "armed aggressors," Interfax reported. Afghanistan has emerged as the world's top source of opium. Initially, poppy cultivation was concentrated in Kandahar and Helmand regions in central and southern Afghanistan, areas under the control of the Taliban. But by the late 1990s poppy cultivation spread to northern regions, in territory dominated by the Taliban's chief opponents, the Northern Alliance. This change in cultivation patterns led the UN's Drug Control and Crime Prevention office to warn that Central Asia was becoming a preferred "transit zone for opium and heroin trafficking." Afghanistan and the Central Asian countries have been home to poppy cultivation for centuries. Until recently poppies were cultivated primarily for medicinal purposes, as the dangers of opium addiction were well understood. In addition, not only did official ideology during the Communist era discourage profiteering and speculation, but the Soviet financial system made profits from illegal drug sales hard to conceal. Also, the Soviet economic system functioned so poorly that goods were so scarce that illegal profits could hardly be used to buy anything of value. The collapse of Communism, followed by the subsequent regional economic crash, helped transform attitudes on drug production and trafficking. The legacy of prolonged civil war in Afghanistan, widespread official corruption throughout Central Asia and other factors have combined to undermine social institutions that might otherwise discourage illegal activities associated with poppy production. After tolerating and even encouraging poppy cultivation for several years, Afghanistan's supreme leader, Mullah Omar, called in 1997 for restrictions on poppy cultivation. Then, in July 2000, Mullah Omar decreed that the Koran and Islamic law forbade the cultivation and trade in opium. Initial reports by international organizations were highly skeptical of Mullah Omar's ban. Later, United Nations officials, whose market-based drug eradication and crop substitution programs have met with mixed success worldwide, reported that the Taliban's top-down decrees to eliminate poppy cultivation appeared to be working. Despite the worst drought in memory, many Afghan farmers had switched to planting wheat, onions, garlic and other crops. Even if the ban does prove effective over the short term, there are reasons to be skeptical about its long-term prospects. Opium is a source of revenue for the Taliban. A ban on cultivation allows the largest producers to assert cartel powers over the drug trade. There are reports that large caches of unprocessed opium are stockpiled in northern Pakistan. As scarcity pushes prices up, overall profits for the big producers may actually increase as a result of the ban. While the true picture of drug transportation routes is far from clear, Central Asia's drug traffickers probably are responsible for shipment of only a minor proportion of the overall Afghanistan opium crop. The highly publicized arrests of drug traffickers at major border points in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan often represent "renegade" operations of traffickers unwilling to play by the established rules. The publicized arrest of "mules" -- individuals who knowingly or unknowingly are carrying small amounts of drugs -- has only marginal effect on overall supply. Most large shipments of Afghanistan opium are probably still routed through distribution routes involving Pakistan. But those distribution routes that do extend throughout the Central Asian countries are now experiencing intense competition in the struggle for control over dwindling deliveries from suppliers. Sorting out who is in and who is out in the new hierarchy of control over distribution is likely to involve conflicts that will have clearly visible consequences. - --- MAP posted-by: Beth