Pubdate: Wed, 23 Jan 2002
Source: Jane's Defence Weekly
Copyright: Jane's Information Group Limited 2002
Contact:  http://www.janes.com/
Details: http://www.mapinc.org/media/521
Author: Martin Dayani, JDW Correspondent, Bogota

TERROR FOCUS ON COLOMBIA

There Are Growing Signs The US May Widen The Scope Of Its Military Aid To 
Bogota In A Stalemate Against Rebels

In January 1999, when Colombia's newly-elected President Andres Pastrana 
launched peace talks with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia 
(FARC), there was great initial optimism of a realistic chance of ending 
the conflict with the country's largest rebel force, which has been 
conducting an increasingly bloody insurgency since the mid-1960s.

However, peace negotiations have moved slowly and have increasingly lost 
credibility. Despite three years of talks, critics say that virtually no 
tangible results have been achieved and that the FARC is not committed to 
negotiating an end to the conflict.

The guerrillas are also widely accused of systematic abuses of a vast 
'demilitarised zone' south of Bogota that was ceded to them at the end of 
1998 to get the talks started. The FARC demanded that the new government 
pull out troops from the 42,000km2 stretch of jungle and savannah as a 
precondition to opening negotiations.

The local environment surrounding the talks has shifted dramatically since 
1999.

While local and international attention has focused on the carrot that 
Pastrana has been offering at the negotiating table, his government was 
simultaneously taking critical steps to alter the military situation which 
made the talks, even on FARC's terms, appear an urgent necessity before 
Pastrana's election.

Over the past three years, the balance of forces has been radically, 
although not decisively, shifted. Colombia's armed forces have undergone a 
far-reaching process of restructuring and modernisation, with the number of 
professional soldiers increasing considerably. Moreover, Pastrana has 
cemented relations with Washington to a degree that was unimaginable under 
the previous government, which had been 'blacklisted' for ties to a 
powerful drug cartel.

Pastrana's new diplomatic axis with Washington led to a sharp increase in 
military and logistical aid under the $1.3 billion Plan Colombia, designed 
to attack drug production and trafficking in the Andean country. A fleet of 
more than 70 helicopters, including 16 new UH-60L Black Hawks, has 
constituted the bulk of the package along with the training and equipping 
of three special army battalions to spearhead the offensive in 
drug-producing zones. The USA has also been involved in upgrading Colombian 
Air Force aircraft and building radar and intelligence-gathering 
capabilities to better control the country's airspace and key 
drug-trafficking routes.

Plan Colombia is a reflection of Washington's growing concern about the 
deteriorating situation in the country, which had become the world's 
largest supplier of coca, the raw material used to manufacture cocaine. 
Over the past two decades, leftist guerrillas, primarily the FARC and the 
smaller National Liberation Army (ELN), along with right-wing paramilitary 
groups, had consolidated control over vast swathes of the Colombian 
countryside, benefiting financially from the explosion in cocaine and opium 
production. Official sources say that armed groups in Colombia derive 
hundreds of millions of dollars each year from their links to drug 
cultivation and trafficking.

Not only has local opinion shifted against FARC after three years of 
fruitless peace efforts, the new international environment that is still 
emerging after 11 September is also destined to have an impact in 
Colombia's remote jungles and inaccessible mountainous zones. It is 
becoming increasingly evident that Washington will not endlessly tolerate 
rebel attacks on Colombia's civilian population and sabotage of the 
country's key energy and economic infrastructure. Washington is also said 
to be interested in the extradition of key FARC leaders for their alleged 
role in the kidnapping and murder of US citizens in Colombia.

While it may be true that the FARC and the ELN were not particularly 
concerned that they appeared on Washington's list of foreign terrorist 
organisations that threaten US interests, that may no longer be the case 
with a distinctly new mood consolidating within the USA's foreign policy 
community.

The new reality has not gone unrecognised in Colombia, where senior 
military officials are now openly comparing the FARC to the Taliban and 
Al-Qaeda.

"FARC have killed many times the number of people that bin Laden has killed 
and they have also carried out many more attacks," said Colombian Army 
commander Gen Jorge Enrique Mora. Colombian military commanders had long 
ago adopted Washington's terminology when referring to the rebels.

The FARC have become increasingly perturbed about the new attitude, 
requesting that Pastrana clarify his position as to whether or not he 
regards them as a 'terrorist' organisation. The group is regarded as 
particularly vulnerable owing to its classification as a 'narco-terrorist' 
organisation, with alleged links to foreign terrorist groups such as the 
Irish Republican Army and the Basque separatist group ETA.

The rebels acknowledge that they levy a 'tax' on the production of coca 
leaf in their regions of influence but they deny that they are involved in 
the processing or transport of narcotics. Although Pastrana publicly says 
that he does not consider FARC to be 'narco-terrorists', this is widely 
seen as a convenient smokescreen for him to allow the negotiations to 
continue. Pastrana himself has said that he would not negotiate with the 
rebels if he considered them to be implicated in drug-trafficking.

Washington has always insisted that it would not become entwined in 
Colombia's quagmire. All military assistance has been subject to strict 
limitations by a US Congress concerned about the dangerous prospect of 
'mission creep'. The number of US military advisers and contractors in 
Colombia is also strictly limited by Congressional decree. US-donated 
equipment, along with the three counter-narcotics battalions, can only be 
deployed in anti-drug operations not counter-insurgency missions. In 
reality, this division has always been widely seen as artificial, owing to 
the situation on the ground, with armed groups having a strong presence in 
the drug-producing zones.

However, the new climate in Washington has apparently generated a greater 
willingness to consider broadening the scope of military aid. Although the 
Bush administration is not likely to consider any direct intervention, 
reports suggest that Washington may be willing to do away with current 
restrictions, permitting Colombia to use the military aid directly against 
the FARC, ELN and other rebels. With peace talks on the brink of collapse, 
it is increasingly likely that the USA will redefine its role in the country.

Although US drug czar John Walters, during a visit to Bogota, refrained 
from commenting on the reports, Colombian officials confirmed that 
Washington is considering the request to step up military assistance, 
including helping to create a new battalion to protect the country's energy 
infrastructure, which is a favourite target particularly of the ELN. The 
attacks have caused hundreds of millions of dollars worth of damage and 
lost petroleum exports.

There is also a growing willingness inside Colombia to aggressively pursue 
more US military aid.
- ---
MAP posted-by: Beth