Pubdate: Sun, 03 Mar 2002
Source: Washington Post (DC)
Copyright: 2002 The Washington Post Company
Contact:  http://www.washingtonpost.com/
Details: http://www.mapinc.org/media/491
Author: Scott Wilson

COLOMBIANS ILL-PREPARED FOR PROLONGED WAR ON REBELS

SAN VICENTE DEL CAGUAN, Colombia -- Returning to a base abandoned three 
years earlier to guerrilla forces, soldiers of the Colombian army's Hunters 
Battalion took a few moments to make it their own again. About 50 men, 
dressed in camouflage battle fatigues despite breathtaking heat, carefully 
trimmed the lawn with hedge clippers and painted the stones along pathways 
a gleaming white.

The housekeeping duties may have seemed an odd priority only hours after 
the army swept into San Vicente del Caguan, a rebel haven during 
now-abandoned peace negotiations. But the business-as-usual attitude was a 
fair representation of Colombia's national mood at the outset of what 
officials say could be the decisive phase of the 38-year-old civil war.

Many Colombians have yet to register that, while the end of peace talks was 
painless, the broader war ahead is likely to demand sharp sacrifices, 
according to political analysts, government officials and military 
officers. They agree that the conflict will deepen for years to come before 
peace talks are likely to resume.

"I have no worries about the military forces of Colombia being defeated 
militarily by terrorist groups," Gen. Fernando Tapias, head of Colombia's 
armed forces, said in an interview. "My concern is that the Colombian 
society and state do not have enough strength and preparation to face 
terrorism. This war is going to take a long time, and in a war on terrorism 
no one can be a spectator."

By ending negotiations last month with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia, or FARC, President Andres Pastrana launched a military campaign 
that is popular so far, particularly among the urban well-to- do who have 
been least affected by the conflict, but that is likely to last longer and 
cost more than many Colombians expect.

The government's foes have grown more powerful during the three years of 
peace talks. There are three irregular armies here: the FARC; a smaller 
Marxist-oriented rebel group, the National Liberation Army; and the United 
Self Defense Forces of Colombia, or AUC, a right-wing paramilitary group 
that opposes the guerrillas, often in concert with the army. In all, 
roughly 35,000 guerrilla and militia troops are at war with the state or 
with each other, twice as many as when peace talks began.

The Colombian army's 70,000 troops face nearly impossible odds against the 
FARC's 18,000 seasoned guerrillas. The group, which emerged in 1964 as a 
rural-based Marxist insurgency, buys its arms with profits derived from 
taxing drug production and from kidnapping and extortion. Senior guerrilla 
commanders have talked about "thousands of dead" as the war intensifies.

U.S. officials agree with military analysts here who say the army must 
double in size just to begin slowing the FARC's growth, let alone roll back 
its presence in every Colombian province and major city. Where those 
resources would come from is unclear. The Bush administration has decided 
against taking a larger step into the conflict, as Pastrana has sought, by 
allowing U.S. military aid earmarked for anti- drug operations to be used 
in the fight against insurgents.

A new intelligence-sharing arrangement is taking shape, however. Foreign 
intelligence sources say the United States is now helping to identify 
potential urban terrorist targets and to prevent kidnappings. But analysts 
question how much good that will do.

"Intelligence is only as good as your ability to act on it," said Luis 
Guillermo Velez, a former senior Defense Ministry official. "What the 
Americans will do is not the key to success here. There are many other 
things that need to be done first. It's going to cost a lot of money and 
it's going to cost a lot of lives. And people are going to be demanding 
results very fast."

Tapias, who complained he "would need four armies of this size to do the 
work I need to," said his objective in the former rebel haven is to 
"restore the area to normalcy." He defined that as bringing security forces 
into all its major towns, controlling roads and uprooting about 50,000 
acres of coca that helped finance the FARC.

But the work has gone slowly since the army moved into the former rebel 
safe haven on Feb. 21. The army has been unable to keep a major road from 
this town to the provincial capital of Florencia free of guerrilla 
roadblocks. The general responsible for the region was fired last week for 
failing to do so.

The FARC, meanwhile, has cut power and phone service to more than 60 urban 
centers around the country, including at least two provincial capitals. 
FARC guerrillas have closed roads, burned trucks and killed villagers 
inside the former haven for allegedly aiding the growing AUC paramilitary 
force, now numbering 15,000 members.

Military officials estimate that the army's mission in the former haven 
could last six months and involve 13,000 troops. That is about 20 percent 
of the army's total troop deployment at a time when the FARC has dispersed 
thousands of fighters to other regions.

"What is the most important aspect of this operation is what could happen 
to the protection of the rest of the country, its infrastructure and all 
the Colombians," said German Vargas, an opposition senator. "Up to now, the 
army has left some holes and has failed to prevent terrorist acts all over 
the country."

When it comes to the war, Tapias said, Colombia "knows what must be done 
but doesn't want to really understand it." Pastrana waited a week to invoke 
special war powers because, political analysts said, he felt pressure from 
business leaders not to frighten off investors. He finally declared martial 
law Thursday in parts of six provinces, but he has not called up reserves, 
as his senior commanders have requested.

Some military analysts believe Pastrana must double military spending to 
effectively challenge the FARC. Colombia has received $1.3 billion as part 
of a U.S. anti-narcotics aid package that includes $650 million for 
military equipment. The military component, which includes some 80 
transport helicopters, was four times the amount of Colombia's annual 
budget for military equipment.

Tapias has increased the proportion of professional, rather than 
conscripted, soldiers in ranks of combat troops and has created elite 
mobile units styled after the U.S. Army Rangers. With its own fleet of 
UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters, the Colombian military has become swift 
enough to react to large guerrilla troop movements.

President Bush has included a $98 million request in his fiscal 2003 budget 
to train a new battalion to protect Colombia's 480-mile Cano Limon oil 
pipeline.

The scarcity of resources already has affected operations in the former 
rebel haven. An aerial bombing campaign to begin the offensive struck 85 
guerrilla targets in more than 200 sorties. But the effort used a large 
part of the air force's $85 million operational budget and its supply of 
500-pound bombs.
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MAP posted-by: Keith Brilhart