Pubdate: Thu, 23 Oct 2003 Source: Miami Herald (FL) Copyright: 2003 The Miami Herald Contact: http://www.miami.com/mld/miamiherald/ Details: http://www.mapinc.org/media/262 Author: Eduardo Gamarra Note: Eduardo Gamarra is director of Florida International University's Latin American and Caribbean Center Bookmark: http://www.mapinc.org/areas/Bolivia Bookmark: http://www.mapinc.org/coke.htm (Cocaine) GIVE THE NEW PRESIDENT A BREATHER Without a truce, or at least a temporary reprieve from all sides, Carlos Mesa, who was sworn in on Friday night, may go down as the one of Bolivia's shortest-lived presidents. To achieve a lasting truce all sides will have to at least temporarily forgo demands for any type of action by the Bolivian government. The likelihood of achieving this kind of respite is slim despite the claims by the social groups that brought down the government of President Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada that they will allow President Mesa to govern. Several reasons explain why the kind of truce that Bolivia is currently experiencing following the four-week-long bloody confrontations between strikers and the military will not last. The most likely source of tension will come from U.S. attempts to ensure that Mesa does not deviate from the goals of completely eradicating the cultivation of coca leaf, the raw material for cocaine, in the Chapare region of central Bolivia. In this sense, Mesa may soon face the stark reality about Bolivia's cocalero movement and its leader, Evo Morales. Since achieving second place in the June 2002 electoral contest that brought Sanchez de Lozada to office with Mesa as the vice president, Morales shrewdly spent thirteen months orchestrating a national movement aimed at destabilizing and prematurely ending the previous government. He achieved his objective last Friday, when Sanchez de Lozada was forced to resign from office. While Morales appears to be more sympathetic to Mesa than to the ousted ''millionaire gringo,'' this honeymoon is likely to be short-lived. Washington will likely demand compliance with counternarcotics programs, especially the eradication of coca cultivation in the Chapare, where Morales holds an iron-clad grip over seven labor unions. The United States is unlikely to give Mesa a reprieve on coca- eradication programs, and Morales is even less likely to accept a full-scale eradication program. This was the same dilemma faced by Sanchez de Lozada, who traveled in vain to Washington in November of last year to request a temporary pause in eradication programs in order to buy time to deal with Morales' threats to paralyze the country. The beleaguered Bolivian president also asked for $150 million to help his government overcome an inherited fiscal deficit that topped 9 percent of GDP. He returned to Bolivia with empty hands and an order to restart eradication in the Chapare. By mid-January, cocalero mobilization in the Chapare began, and the government's armed response initiated the long series of deaths that eventually led to Sanchez de Lozada's resignation. If Mesa chooses to eradicate, his government will soon face mobilization by coca-growing farmers in the Chapare followed by road blockades and work stoppages. Any attempt to clear roadblocks with the use of police or military forces is likely to produce casualties and, in the short-to mid-term, is likely to lead to a full-scale mobilization against the new Bolivian government. This has been a recurrent pattern in Bolivia for at least a decade, although it became particularly acute in the last six years after the government of General Hugo Banzer and Jorge ''Tuto'' Quiroga implemented a so-called Dignity Plan that dramatically reduced coca cultivation in the Chapare. The Dignity Plan was so successful that former U.S. Ambassador Manuel Rocha boasted that no Bolivian cocaine reached U.S. shores. On the other hand, if Mesa opts against eradication, the United States is unlikely to continue funding development programs, and Bolivia could soon end up on the list of countries decertified for noncompliance with Washington's counterdrug programs. The list is generally crafted at the end of each year and announced in early March. A decertified Bolivia is not in the best interest of the United States, as this would likely strengthen Morales and perhaps even result in his eventual ascension to power. Moreover, a pause in eradication may be the best chance for the Mesa government to achieve its ambitious agenda to make Bolivian democracy more representative and inclusive. At the same time it could lead to a massive upsurge in coca cultivation and cocaine production destined for the Brazilian and not the U.S. market. This may prove to be a moment for Washington to consider granting the Bolivian government some sort of reprieve on the coca front. After all, if no Bolivian cocaine reaches the United States, then maybe this is no longer a Washington issue. Instead, U.S. officials could focus on helping Mesa overcome the dramatic situation in Bolivia. President Luis Inacio Lula da Silva, on the other hand, may want to speak to fellow labor leader Evo Morales about rising crime, addiction and drug trafficking in Brazil. Eduardo Gamarra is director of Florida International University's Latin American and Caribbean Center. - --- MAP posted-by: Larry Seguin