Pubdate: Thu, 06 Feb 2003 Source: Wall Street Journal (US) Copyright: 2003 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. Contact: http://www.wsj.com/ Details: http://www.mapinc.org/media/487 Author: Scott Wilson, the Washington Post MILITARY TRAINING IN COLOMBIA MOVES BEYOND COUNTERNARCOTICS SARAVENA, Colombia -- The arrival of U.S. Special Forces trainers in this battered town last month signaled the beginning of a change that gives the U.S. more direct military involvement in Colombia's long civil war and could lead the country's two leftist guerrilla armies to broaden attacks against U.S. targets. Late last month, the smaller of the two Marxist-oriented guerrilla movements, the National Liberation Army, kidnapped a British and an American journalist in this rich oil region of eastern Colombia, saying the province has become a "war zone declared by the North American government and the Colombian state." Although meant as an explanation for the abduction of the journalists, who were released Saturday after 11 days in rebel hands, the warning stirred deep anxiety among Colombian civilians that the presence of U.S. troops will prompt a sharp response from the guerrillas. Over the course of this year, Arauca province is scheduled to become the center of gravity for a U.S. effort costing $470 million (euro432.3 million) a year to help President Alvaro Uribe cripple the enduring leftist insurgency by strengthening Colombia's military. The training program here will emphasize counterinsurgency rather than counter-narcotics techniques that had been the focus of U.S. aid to date. In expanding the training beyond counternarcotics, the U.S. has abandoned an ambiguity that was once carefully cultivated by U.S. officials, promising to make the U.S. a higher-profile player in Colombia's 39-year-old war. Beginning this month, U.S. officials will start shifting military resources once used in antidrug operations in southern Colombia to this province, which lies on the Venezuelan border 220 miles east of Bogota, the Colombian capital. Those helicopters will be used directly against the two guerrilla armies, which the State Department considers terrorist organizations. Additional helicopters and other military equipment are scheduled for purchase under the program. The effort has been presented as a way of helping Colombian troops protect the government's economically important oil pipeline from guerrilla attack. But it is clear in the training taking place on an army base here that defending the pipeline will mostly entail offensive operations against the seasoned guerrilla fronts that have prospered on this swampy stretch of oil and coca fields. The first military unit selected for training, for instance, is a counterguerrilla battalion, not a unit whose principle task is pipeline protection. "I look at this [program] more as one that is trying to establish security in an area where there just happens to be a pipeline," a U.S. official said. The 70 U.S. trainers in Arauca -- more than half here, the rest on nearby bases in Cano Limon and Arauca city to the east -- are a useful propaganda symbol for guerrillas, who have long warned of U.S. economic designs on Colombia's natural wealth. The message has resonated all the more as the U.S. prepares for a possible war in Iraq that could disrupt world oil supplies. The U.S. trainers, who aren't authorized to participate in military operations, have arrived on this bewildering battlefield as the first phase of a larger buildup. In coming weeks, U.S. officials say, at least five UH-1H Huey II helicopters will be sent from the south to support counterinsurgency here. Those helicopters, funded under a $1.3 billion U.S. antidrug package, were restricted to antidrug operations until the Bush administration received congressional approval last year to allow their use in counterinsurgency. About 25 U.S. trainers will remain in Larandia, the army base in southern Colombia, preparing troops to carry out operations against drug labs and coca crops. In addition, 15 U.S. trainers based in Tolemaida, west of Bogota, are preparing a 300-man commando battalion to be used to hunt important guerrilla commanders or destroy guerrilla command-and-control centers. Last week, troops from the 30th Counter-Guerrilla Battalion based in Fortul, 12 miles to the south, gathered to begin the 10-week course on "how to move, communicate and shoot," in the words of one U.S. official. U.S. officials hope to train two battalions of the 18th Brigade, about 800 men, this year. Saravena, a city of 40,000 once dominated by guerrilla militia networks, offers a surreal picture of Colombia's war. Despite the oil riches that surround the city, the urban centerpiece is a bombed-out police station and city hall, the rubble lined with sandbags and gun emplacements. The airport, destroyed last year by guerrilla attacks, remains decorated with signs sponsored by the chamber of commerce that cheerfully invite passengers to return soon. The National Liberation Army, a 5,000-member Cuban-inspired insurgency known by its initials as the ELN, has profited from the oil pipeline, which runs 500 miles from Cano Limon to Covenas on the Caribbean Coast. In general, the ELN bleeds funds from sympathetic nonprofit organizations and city halls that get extra taxes and subsidies from pipeline royalties. The ELN's larger cousin, the 18,000-member Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC, has moved in more recently, seeking its own share of the royalties. Although both guerrilla groups have declared U.S. interests in Colombia to be military objectives, they have usually reserved their attacks for helicopters, counternarcotics spray planes and economic infrastructure. The notorious exception was the FARC's 1999 killing of three American indigenous-rights activists in Arauca, the result of a power struggle between the guerrilla groups. The most prominent guerrilla target has been the pipeline, jointly operated by the government and Los Angeles-based Occidental Petroleum. The guerrillas, primarily the FARC, blew up the pipeline 170 times in 2001, according to the state oil company, Ecopetrol. According to military officials and provincial politicians, the objective of most bombings was to force the ELN to share more of the proceeds. The attacks cost the government $500 million in revenue in 2001, money the U.S. wants Mr. Uribe to be able to invest in the war effort. Bombings dropped to 42 last year with better security and a guerrilla agreement over money. Mr. Uribe last week ordered that Arauca's oil royalties, amounting to about $42 million a year, must be managed by his administration rather than by the provincial government in a move designed to choke off the ELN financing. That angered regional political leaders, who say not a penny of promised social aid has arrived since September, when Mr. Uribe declared the region a special security zone. - --- MAP posted-by: Josh