Pubdate: Mon, 07 Feb 2005
Source: Christian Science Monitor (US)
Copyright: 2005 The Christian Science Publishing Society
Contact:  http://www.csmonitor.com/
Details: http://www.mapinc.org/media/83
Author: Rachel Van Dongen, Correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor

COLOMBIA'S AMBITIOUS PEACE PLAN HITS ROADBLOCKS

The 24 Nations That Were Asked to Fund Disarmament Last Week Said
Colombia Must Stiffen Penalties for Ex-Fighters.

BOGOTA, COLOMBIA - When right-wing fighters abandoned La Gabarra late
last year as part of a government-sponsored peace process, weary
residents who were forcibly displaced five years earlier looked
forward to finally returning home.

But there were some surprises waiting for them when they got back to
their small town in northern Colombia. It turns out that the
paramilitaries, who commandeered 105 farms and 58 homes in a 1999
raid, ran up thousands of dollars in utility bills and didn't pay the
property taxes. Worse, it is unclear how residents can reclaim
property that was once theirs, as many of the original owners didn't
have official land titles.

Meanwhile, the former fighters weren't faring much better. A lack of
jobs and the funds to reintegrate them into society have also
contributed to a fading of the initial euphoria over President Alvaro
Uribe's ambitious plan to demobilize 20,000 right-wing paramilitaries
by the end of this year.

"There isn't work," says Fabio Rincon Calisto, an official with the
mayor's office in Tibu, about two hours from La Gabarra. "That's our
worry."

The United Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) was formed by wealthy
landowners in the 1980s to combat leftist rebels but now derives a
large portion of its profits from the drug trade. Since November,
3,674 fighters have demobilized, leaving behind 4,510 weapons. But
according to a survey of 2,624 ex-fighters taken by the office of the
peace commissioner at the end of 2004, 12.5 percent of the demobilized
are illiterate, 50 percent have no more than a fifth-grade education,
and 88 percent own no possessions whatsoever. This, say observers,
illustrates the long-term challenge to ending Colombia's 40-year civil
war.

Mauricio Romero, an AUC expert at External University here, argues
that the government moved too quickly to demobilize thousands of young
troops, putting political considerations first. "The national
government has acted in an impromptu way and has even given priority
to the political benefit of demobilization instead of what's going to
happen to these boys," Mr. Romero says.

He notes that the government has not given local municipalities the
appropriate technical and financial assistance - such as work and
education programs - that would allow successful assimilation of the
ex-fighters into society. Thus, bigger cities with more resources are
likely to have better support programs than smaller towns. Romero
argues that the $156 a month government stipend, paid to ex-combatants
for 18 months, isn't sufficient for young men used to earning a living
from crime. "These boys might be satisfied for the moment, but that's
not going to last for very long," he says.

But it's unclear whether the government can even afford a massive
demobilization. At a conference late last week in the seaside city of
Cartagena, 24 countries that Mr. Uribe asked to help pay for the peace
process said that Colombia must punish the former fighters before
these countries will contribute funds. Under Colombian law, the
majority of fighters will be pardoned for illegally taking up arms,
but there is no consensus on what to do with those who have committed
crimes for which they can't receive amnesty, such as kidnapping,
killing, and drug trafficking.

The government sparked an outcry when it suggested that those AUC
members could be confined to a jail in Santa Fe de Ralito, a safe zone
where AUC leaders are living free from prosecution while negotiating
with the government. Critics have suggested that it might be more of
an open-air detention center than a jail.

The demobilization process is also rife with holes that could lower
its chances of success, say observers. Before demobilizing, fighters
are given cursory interviews in special concentration zones. A list of
their names is sent to the attorney general's office in order to
establish which fighters have arrest warrants, but no further
investigation is done.

The vast majority of ex-fighters are allowed to return home, while
those with warrants for unpardonable crimes are sent to Ralito to
await passage of legislation to decide their fate. But reports that 11
of these fighters disappeared from Ralito without permission throw the
efficacy of this system into doubt.

The ex-fighters who do return home are required to appear at least
once at a "reference center." There they can receive job training and
some education, but there is no comprehensive rehabilitation program
currently in place. Members of the attorney general's office are
present to take voluntary testimony, but nothing more is required to
receive benefits. 
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MAP posted-by: Richard Lake