Pubdate: Thu, 26 May 2005
Source: Winnipeg Free Press (CN MB)
Copyright: 2005 Winnipeg Free Press
Contact:  http://www.winnipegfreepress.com/
Details: http://www.mapinc.org/media/502
Author: Ted Galen Carpenter, Knight Ridder
Bookmark: http://www.mapinc.org/heroin.htm (Heroin)
Note: Ted Galen Carpenter, vice-president for defence and foreign policy 
studies at the Cato Institute, is the author or editor of 16 books on 
international affairs.

AFGHANISTAN IS HOOKED ON OPIUM

DRUG policy officials at the U.S. embassy in Afghanistan are apparently 
miffed at President Hamid Karzai. In a widely publicized cable to Secretary 
of State Condoleezza Rice, they charged that the U.S.-funded poppy 
eradication program aimed at curbing Afghanistan's booming heroin trade is 
ineffective because, among other reasons, Mr. Karzai "has been unwilling to 
exert strong leadership."

These overeager drug warriors need a healthy dose of realism.

Given the importance of the drug trade to Afghanistan's economy, asking Mr. 
Karzai to wage war on opium poppy farmers is inviting him to commit 
political suicide. Understandably, he is reluctant to oblige.

Not surprisingly, Washington wants to dry up a significant source of funds 
flowing to al-Qaeda and the Taliban. But those are not the only factions 
involved in drug trafficking. Many of Mr. Karzai's political allies are 
warlords who control the drug trade in their respective regions.

They use the revenues from that trade to pay the militias that keep them in 
power in their fiefdoms and give them national political clout.

Some of these individuals backed the Taliban when that faction was in 
power, switching sides only when the United States launched its military 
offensive in Afghanistan in October, 2001. A vigorous anti-drug campaign 
might cause them to change their allegiance yet again, and Mr. Karzai seems 
aware of the danger.

His political problem, however, runs deeper than merely needing to placate 
friendly warlords.

The drug trade is the lynchpin of Afghanistan's economy. According to the 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the annual trade now 
amounts to approximately $2.8 billion.

UNODC's November, 2004 Opium Survey concluded that "the opium economy is 
now equivalent to about 60 per cent of Afghanistan's 2003 GDP ($4.6 
billion, if only licit activity is measured)."

According to the United Nations, the number of Afghan families involved in 
opium poppy cultivation rose by 35 per cent in 2004, reaching an estimated 
356,000 families.

Even measured on a nuclear family basis, that translates into roughly 2.3 
million people -- about 10 per cent of Afghanistan's population. Given the 
role of extended families and clans in Afghan society, the number of people 
affected is much greater than that. Indeed, it is likely that at least 30 
per cent of the population is involved directly or indirectly in the drug 
trade.

For many of those people, opium poppy crops and other aspects of drug 
commerce are the difference between modest prosperity and destitution. They 
will not look kindly on efforts to destroy their livelihood. "To take away 
the livelihood of farmers could be dangerous in some parts of Afghanistan," 
warned Habibullah Qaderi, the country's counter-narcotics minister.

Another Western official associated with the anti-narcotics effort conceded 
that U.S. drug war hawks who want to see U.S. troops become involved in 
interdiction and eradication efforts do not fully understand the possible 
ramifications.

Despite those daunting economic factors, the U.S. government is putting 
increased pressure on the Karzai government to crack down on the drug 
trade. The Afghan regime is responding cautiously, trying to convince 
Washington that it is serious about dealing with the problem without 
launching an anti-drug crusade that will alienate large segments of the 
population. It has tried to achieve that balance by focusing on 
high-profile raids against drug processing labs -- mostly those that are 
not controlled by warlords friendly to the government in Kabul -- rather 
than crop eradication measures.

U.S. pressure on the drug issue risks undermining the Karzai government. 
That is especially true with crop eradication schemes.

If Kabul succumbs to U.S. pressure and ultimately agrees to an aerial 
spraying campaign, Mr. Karzai will be at war with a significant part of his 
own population. Given Afghanistan's political fragility, that would be an 
extremely unwise move.

The United States must not become the enemy of Afghan farmers whose 
livelihood depends on opium poppy cultivation. True, some of the funds from 
the drug trade will find their way into the coffers of the Taliban and 
al-Qaeda. That is an inevitable side effect of a global prohibitionist 
policy that creates such an enormous profit from illegal drugs.

But alienating pro-Western Afghan factions in an effort to disrupt the flow 
of revenue to the Islamic radicals is too high a price to pay. Washington 
should stop asking President Karzai to do the impossible.
- ---
MAP posted-by: Beth