Pubdate: Sun, 09 Apr 2006
Source: Miami Herald (FL)
Copyright: 2006 The Miami Herald
Contact:  http://www.miami.com/mld/miamiherald/
Details: http://www.mapinc.org/media/262
Author: Steven Dudley
Bookmark: http://www.mapinc.org/topics/Plan+Colombia
Bookmark: http://www.mapinc.org/topics/Colombia
Bookmark: http://www.mapinc.org/topics/coca
Bookmark: http://www.mapinc.org/coke.htm (Cocaine)

AN IMPERFECT PLAN

Five years and $7.5 billion later, Plan Colombia is still struggling
to solve the puzzle of how to shift Colombians away from illegal crops.

The story of Plan Colombia -- the U.S.-funded, $7.5 billion strategy
launched to smash the cocaine traffic in this country -- may be best
understood by studying a project to grow an ingredient for fancy
salads near this once formidable coca-growing area.

Planting acres of the palm trees that produce hearts of palm was one
of many projects launched under the plan in late 2000 -- a means by
which the hundreds of families that grew coca, the raw material for
the cocaine sold on U.S. streets, were going to make a legal living.

Some of the palms wilted when airplanes carrying herbicide to kill
coca bushes sprayed the trees instead. Profits from the
commercialization of the edible hearts were slow in coming, and so
some farmers abandoned the project. Others sold the trees to buy coca
seeds and restock their sprayed fields.

But many of the trees that survived are being harvested, and their
hearts boiled and canned in a processing plant near here. They are
then transported via a dusty road and sold in national and
international stores under the brand name AgroAmazonia.

This was one of the few, partial victories of Plan Colombia, a
five-year plan launched here because at the time this lush valley in
the southern department of Putumayo was covered virtually roadside to
roadside with coca bushes -- one-fourth Colombia's entire estimated
coca acreage in 2000.

Five years and about $7.5 billion later -- and after an expansion to
include anti-guerrila assistance in the wake of the Sept. 11 attacks
- -- the rest of Plan Colombia has produced similarly mixed results.

It has reduced nationwide coca acreage by half through a massive
campaign of aerial spraying with herbicides. There are even some hints
that cocaine prices are up and purity is down on U.S. streets because
of the drop in coca production.

It also has deployed government workers and security personnel to
areas previously all but abandoned by the state, helped slow steady
gains by leftist guerrillas and generated hope that Colombia can
overcome four decades of war largely fueled by the revenue from the
drug trade.

It's A Start

"Without [Plan Colombia], the war would be a lot worse now," said
Diana Rojas, a professor of International Relations at the National
University in Bogota. "This doesn't mean it's a panacea . . . [But]
Plan Colombia did something very important, which was to show that the
country needed a military strategy."

However, Plan Colombia has its limitations and its enemies. It is a
frequent target for leftist politicians and groups who criticize the
expanded U.S. influence in Colombian politics: one graffiti near a
Bogota university reads, "Plan Colombia. Urinate Here."

In the countryside, coca growers have altered their techniques to
produce more per acre than before the aerial spraying campaign began,
government and non-governmental observers say. Left-wing guerrillas
and right-wing paramilitaries continue to pressure growers to stay in
the business and have gained more direct control over the trade than
ever in order to fill their war coffers.

And many frustrated local politicians and farmers who participated in
counter-coca projects like the hearts of palm program in Putumayo
complain they got little or nothing out of them.

"They tricked us like little kids," said Jose Agudelo, a community
leader in the Valle del Guamuez municipality where Plan Colombia got
its start.

Genesis of Project

Plan Colombia was forged by President Bill Clinton and former
Colombian President Andres Pastrana, and the first U.S. aid package
worth $1.1 billion left Washington in 2000. Another round of U.S. aid
for the effort will be debated in the U.S. Congress this spring.

Timing was important: Colombia had become the world's No. 1 producer
of cocaine; rebels from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia,
known as FARC, were launching massive attacks on police and military
installations; illegal paramilitary groups were gaining supporters in
their fight against the guerrillas, even while committing wholesale
massacres against civilians suspected of aiding the rebels.

The first aid package included $800 million for intelligence
equipment, helicopter gunships and training of three Colombian army
battalions by U.S. Green Berets to fight the drug trade.

But from the beginning, the bulk of the aid has been destined for
guerrilla zones, analysts say. In all, $3.8 billion of U.S. money has
gone toward military efforts, mostly in FARC-controlled areas. U.S.
restrictions on anti-guerrilla actions, put in place amid
congressional fears of involvement in Colombia's civil war, were
mostly lifted after the 9/11 attacks.

Some observers, such as Ricardo Vargas of the Colombian think tank
Accion Andina, contend that Plan Colombia has focused too much on
leftist rebel areas, opening the way for paramilitaries to gain a
firmer foothold in the drug trade.

"The paramilitaries expanded and expanded to all the areas they
could, to use them as routes, for processing and for production [of
cocaine]," Vargas said.

Indeed, paramilitary groups currently control many of the drug routes
leading from guerrilla-held areas to Colombia's two coasts and abroad,
according to anti-drug officials in Colombia and the United States.
And local authorities in places such as Putumayo say the civil war
continues apace despite the increased military and police presence in
these areas.

"The levels of violence continue to be terrifying," said Leandro
Romo, the central government's ombudsman in La Hormiga, the main town
in the Guamuez valley. "They talk to me about Plan Colombia, and none
of that has changed the dynamic of the conflict. There are still
homicides, disappearences, displacement, and guerrilla
incursions."

'Moving Forward'

Officials such as U.S. Ambassador William Wood argue that the drug
trafficking activities of both guerrillas and paramilitaries have been
hampered by the plan and violence is down. But he acknowledges the
effort still has a ways to go.

"We are taking the first steps," Wood said in reference to the fight
against these armed groups' involvement in the trade. "We haven't
crossed the goal line yet, but we are moving forward to it."

Wood also emphasized the alternative development projects launched to
lure farmers away from coca. Bolstered by an estimated $900 million in
U.S. aid, hundreds of such projects have emerged throughout the
country in places such as Putumayo. But according to many recipients
of aid and politicians in the region, these projects are often poorly
funded, poorly planned, layered in bureaucracy and
shortsighted.

Not Profitable

Farmers in Putumayo complained to The Miami Herald that cows they were
offered for sale by the state were of low quality; poultry projects
failed because of competition from larger producers; fish farming
lacked technical assistance and had to contend with the frequent
guerrilla attacks that limited their ability to transport their goods
to market.

"The people just keep planting coca because the projects weren't
profitable," said Luis Fernando Palacios, the chief of staff to the
mayor in La Hormiga. "They had no real infrastructure like roads."

In fact, no road has been paved in Putumayo since Plan Colombia
started, despite promises by national authorities stretching back to
2000. Luis Alfonso Hoyos, the direct of the National Solidarity
Network, a government agency that helps administer projects in places
such as Putumayo, admits there has been too much bureaucracy and that
failures outnumber successes.

"We haven't been able to provide an alternative," he told The Miami
Herald. "But we're still working on it."

Data Questioned

Plan Colombia, however, seems to have achieved some of its goals. The
massive aerial spraying campaign, plus a voluntary eradication program
that paid farmers to hand-pull their coca bushes, helped achieve the
plan's goal of reducing Colombia coca acreage by 50 percent in five
years, according to U.S. government estimates of the acreage.

But Colombian, international and even some U.S. authorities question
the reliability of such data. In a December report, the General
Accountability Office stated that cocaine production "estimates could
be widely off the mark."

A 2005 report by the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime in Colombia showed
only minimal changes in cocaine prices in Colombia and the United
States through 2004. And watchdog groups, like Vargas' Accion Andina,
say that drug production has not dropped as significantly as U.S.
officials claim.

Battling Fumigation

Coca farmers, according to the UNODC and Vargas, have adjusted to the
aerial spraying by planting smaller plots in more remote areas,
camouflaging their plants, obtaining more productive strains of coca
and simply replanting faster than sprayers can return. Because coca
bushes can be harvested six months after they are planted, authorities
are finding it difficult to keep up.

"The strategy of aerial fumigation hit a wall," Alberto Rueda, a
former top eradication campaign advisor to the Colombian government,
told The Miami Herald in an e-mail.

What's more, the aerial eradication plan seemed to be out of sync with
the alternative crop and social assistance programs. The airplanes,
for instance, sprayed even while farmers were switching from coca to
palm trees.

After the most recent spraying of herbicides in this area, in
December, palm growers lost 150 acres of trees, said Julio Cesar
Ramos, president of the AgroAmazonia hearts of palm factory just
outside Puerto Asis, the center of commerce in Putumayo.

"Why are we going to plant trees if the government just turns around
and sprays them," said Franco Ruales, a farmer in the Guamuez valley.
"Look at this," he added, pointing to the dead palm trees. "This is
turning into a desert."

"The government says, 'spray, spray, spray,"' Ramos told The Miami
Herald. "There's nothing we can do."

Still, Ramos says, the hearts of palm program will continue. The
factory is shipping its cans oo the three biggest supermarkets in
Colombia. And with a little more money, its managers hope to soon
produce juices and fertilizer.

"Given all the failures, this is a success," he said. "This cannot
fail. If this fails, then everything will come crashing down."
- ---
MAP posted-by: Richard Lake