Pubdate: Tue, 11 Dec 2007 Source: Wall Street Journal (US) Copyright: 2007 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. Contact: http://www.wsj.com/ Details: http://www.mapinc.org/media/487 Author: Jess Bravin and Gary Fields Bookmark: http://www.mapinc.org/coke.htm (Cocaine) Bookmark: http://www.mapinc.org/mdma.htm (Ecstasy) Bookmark: http://www.mapinc.org/find?199 (Mandatory Minimum Sentencing) JUSTICES BACK SENTENCING LEEWAY Rulings May Bring an End To Era of Rigid Formulas, Open Door to Rehearings WASHINGTON -- In a pair of rulings, the Supreme Court emphatically declared that trial judges have wide discretion over criminal sentencing, effectively ending the federal law's 20-year experiment with rigid formulas for punishing individual defendants. Taken together, the rulings will broaden the discretion of federal district-court judges in handing out sentences. They could also lead to thousands of defendants seeking a rehearing. The rulings are potentially more expansive than the Supreme Court's last word on such guidelines in 2005. After that, the court sent back more than 400 cases to lower courts for rehearings. "Every federal defendant who is on appeal, about to be sentenced or has been sentenced and lost on appeal is about to call his or her lawyer and say, 'Can we do anything with this,'" said Douglas Berman, a professor and expert on federal sentencing at the Ohio State University law school. In 1984, Congress adopted a sentencing system that was designed to equalize sentences for similar crimes. It charged a sentencing commission with developing formulas that required judges to impose sentences, within a range, depending on facts of the case. In a 2005 case known as Booker, the Supreme Court ruled that such guidelines were unconstitutional because they required judges to consider facts not proven to a jury. But the court's splintered opinion didn't clearly outline how much weight trial judges should give the guidelines. Earlier this year, the court ruled that it is reasonable for a judge to follow the guidelines -- meaning a defendant would face a heavy burden to have it thrown out. Yesterday, the court ruled that the reverse doesn't follow: A sentence that deviates from the guidelines isn't necessarily unreasonable. As such, the rulings make clear that sentences imposed by trial judges generally can be reversed only for "abuse of discretion" -- a rare event -- as long as they stay within the minimums and maximums prescribed by law. In one case, the court upheld a trial judge who rejected the additional penalties that federal sentencing guidelines impose for crack-cocaine crimes over those for powder cocaine. The drugs have the same active ingredient. Crack defendants are typically black, and powder defendants more commonly white. In the case, a federal judge in Virginia sentenced Derrick Kimbrough to 15 years for intent to distribute more than 50 grams of crack, among other crimes. The guidelines called for at least 19 years, so the government appealed. A federal appeals court in Richmond, Va., sided with the government, ruling that judges may not impose lighter sentences "based on a disagreement with the sentencing disparity for crack and powder cocaine offenses." Writing for the court, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg said that while judges must give "respectful consideration" to the sentencing guidelines, judges are free to "tailor the sentence in light of other statutory concerns as well," such as the "history and characteristics of the defendant." The trial judge noted that Mr. Kimbrough had no prior felony convictions and was a combat veteran. In November, the U.S. Sentencing Commission, responding in part to criticism of the disparate racial impact, reduced the difference in guidelines for crack and powder cocaine. Today, the commission is expected to announce that the lessened penalties will apply retroactively to the 19,500 crack offenders now in federal prison. In the other case, the court likewise found that a trial judge had acted properly when he gave a lenient sentence to a former drug dealer. A federal judge in Iowa sentenced Brian Gall to three years of probation, rather than a like period in prison, because of his unusual story of "self-rehabilitation." While a University of Iowa student in 2000, Mr. Gall had taken part in a ring distributing the drug popularly known as ecstasy. Mr. Gall withdrew from the operation after seven months, graduated from college and became a master carpenter. Years later, federal agents tracked him down, and he admitted having taken part in the drug ring. Mr. Gall was indicted and pleaded guilty. A federal appeals court in St. Louis threw out the sentence, agreeing with the government that the trial judge had given too much weight to Mr. Gall's successful effort to go straight. Writing for the Supreme Court, Justice John Paul Stevens said the appellate court mistakenly assumed there was some exact formula for measuring such factors. "The formula is a classic example of attempting to measure an inventory of apples by counting oranges," Justice Stevens wrote. Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito dissented from both rulings. (Kimbrough v. U.S.; Gall v. U.S.) - --- MAP posted-by: Steve Heath