Pubdate: Tue, 10 Apr 2007
Source: Washington Post (DC)
Page: A15
Copyright: 2007 The Washington Post Company
Contact:  http://www.washingtonpost.com/
Details: http://www.mapinc.org/media/491
Author: R. Jeffrey Smith, Washington Post Staff Writer
Bookmark: http://www.mapinc.org/topic/Afghanistan
Bookmark: http://www.mapinc.org/heroin.htm (Heroin)
Bookmark: http://www.mapinc.org/people/McCaffrey

McCAFFREY SEES 2007 AS A CRUCIAL YEAR

"We Are Now in a Race Against Time."

When retired Army Gen. Barry R. McCaffrey visited Afghanistan in 
February for meetings with 23 senior Western and local military, 
intelligence and political officials, he came away with a cautiously 
optimistic view of the prospects for reform and political stability there.

McCaffrey, a respected division commander in the 1991 Persian Gulf 
War and commander of U.S. military operations in Central America and 
South America, now teaches at West Point. A copy of his trip report, 
written for his colleagues there but widely circulated in Washington 
and obtained from one of the recipients, included the following blunt 
observations:

"Afghanistan is now a narco-state. The opium/heroin take is $3.1 
billion -- which is 1/3 of the GNP. The British have the lead for the 
[counter-drug] program and are not adequately resourced for the 
effort. There is no single unifying leadership for the U.S. nor 
international effort."

"If we do not get a serious and sustained effort on counter-drug 
operations . . . we will fail to achieve our objectives. . . . This 
should be a 10,000 man [local] program, supported by a $250 million 
[U.S.] program -- with an in-country presence of 200+ DEA agents."

"We are now in a race against time. We must deal with: the Taliban 
(700 percent increase in IED's [improvised explosive devices] -- 140 
suicide bombers last year); the criminals who control much of the 
ground-level governance of the largest narco-state operation in the 
world; foreign fighters who now plot terrorism against both the 
Afghan Government and the U.S. . . . and finally from the growing 
disaffection of the suffering people of Afghanistan who lack police, 
roads, electricity, security, jobs, and belief in their government."

"We can, without question, achieve our U.S. national objective of a 
functioning law-based state -- with a performing, non-drug economy -- 
which rejects sanctuary for terrorism. This is a cross-over year."

"The effort to create the Afghan police force is currently grossly 
under-resourced with 700 U.S. trainers. . . . In Iraq, we have 7000 
U.S. police trainers. . . . In Kosovo, we had 5000 police mentors. . 
. . We have trained 60,000 Afghan police, but we have no idea where 
they are. . . . Probably there are non-uniformed, untrained and 
largely criminal elements in many of the district capitals. There are 
no real jails -- or prosecutors -- or judges -- or squad cars.

"Without effective police, there will be no effective reconstruction. 
. . . The Germans have the lead . . . [and have] done an inadequate 
job. The German program consists of a few senior German police 
mentors of enormous professionalism but few resources."

The Afghan National Army "is much better postured. . . . They have 
pride, embedded U.S. trainers, a functioning chain-of-command, a 
superb combat leader. . . . They are the first element of national 
unity in 100 years." But they have "for all practical purposes no air 
power . . . [and] no high speed, wheeled light armor. . . . They have 
junk small arms . . . [and] lack body armor."

"If we want to be out of Afghanistan in 15 years, we need to spend 10 
Billion dollars" equipping the Army and police.

"NATO presence . . . is a political and security triumph. . . . 
However, the NATO forces are too weak on the ground, lack essential 
supporting elements, . . . have severely restrictive 
rules-of-engagement, and may lack the political will to fight when required."

"The most important single factor in Afghanistan, without which 
nothing else is possible, is the reality of the enormous courage, 
aggressiveness, discipline, and flexibility of U.S. combat forces. . 
. . U.S. Air Force and Naval air power is the monster combat 
multiplier. We have employed three times the tonnage of ordnance in 
Afghanistan as in Iraq."

"The central key to winning the war in Afghanistan is economic 
reconstruction and employment . . . [but] the current system has been 
badly organized, marked by U.S. government turf battles, badly 
resourced, and has poor oversight. The allies provide inadequate help."

"Fortunately, help is on the way. If Congress acts, we should see 
$10.6 billion in economic and military aid approved for the Afghans. 
. . . We must lose the 'Expeditionary' mindset. Reconstruction in 
this destroyed nation is going to take 25 years." 
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MAP posted-by: Richard Lake