Pubdate: Sun, 13 Jun 2010 Source: New York Times (NY) Page: WK11 Copyright: 2010 The New York Times Company Contact: http://www.nytimes.com/ Details: http://www.mapinc.org/media/298 Author: Daniel Okrent Note: Daniel Okrent, a former public editor of The Times, is the author of "Last Call: The Rise and Fall of Prohibition." Bookmark: http://www.mapinc.org/opinion.htm (Opinion) Bookmark: http://www.mapinc.org/topic/Prohibition NO CLOSING TIME FOR INCOME TAXES ON March 19, 1928, eight years into the reign of constitutional Prohibition, Pierre S. du Pont wrote a letter to William P. Smith, one of the very few people he ever addressed by first name. Du Pont was among the wealthiest men in the world, chairman of both his family's chemical colossus and the du Pont-controlled General Motors Corporation. Smith worked for a less well-known enterprise that Pierre du Pont also dominated: the Association Against the Prohibition Amendment. "The object of the organization," du Pont told his friend Bill, "is not merely the return of the use of alcoholic beverages in the United States." He went on, "Another important factor is the tremendous loss of revenue to our government through the Prohibition laws" -- the revenue once collected through taxes on liquor and beer. With the end of Prohibition, he wrote, "the revenue of the government would be increased sufficiently to warrant the abolition of the income tax and corporation tax." For today's advocates of legalized, taxable marijuana -- or new levies on, say, electricity use, baseball tickets or high-fructose corn syrup -- it's an appealing model. Some even believe that a tax on marijuana, which could be legalized by California voters this November, could lead to a reduction in the state's income taxes. But the history of the intimate relationship between drinking and taxing suggests otherwise. The link between the two is as old as the Republic; Alexander Hamilton provoked the Whiskey Rebellion when he persuaded Congress in 1791 to enact the first federal tax on liquor to help pay down the national debt. By 1910, as anti-alcohol forces were making a significant impact on American politics, the federal government was annually drawing more than 70 percent of its domestic revenue from the bottle and the keg. In those years before the advent of the income tax, only the tariff on foreign goods and materials provided a larger share. The nation's dependence on the alcohol tax created a vexing problem for the leaders of the Prohibition movement. As early as 1883, the editors of the Woman's Christian Temperance Union's official newspaper coyly asked their readers, "How, then, will [we] support the government" if the sale of liquor is prohibited? The editors had a ready answer: an income tax, they wrote, was "the most just and equable arrangement ever made for the equalization of governmental burdens." In 1895, the Prohibition Party recognized that an excise tax "is a pledge on the part of the state to defend and foster the thing taxed," and it soon nailed an income tax plank to its platform. And leaders of the most powerful Dry organization, the Anti-Saloon League, grumpily aware of what one called the "alleged 'loss of revenue' argument," chose to focus most of its attention on state-by-state, rather than federal, prohibitory laws. But the league also encouraged the populist campaign to authorize an income tax. When this support finally bore fruit in 1913, the organization announced that "the adoption of the Income Tax Amendment to the federal Constitution furnishes an answer to the revenue problem." As a result, it said, the time had come for all foes of alcohol to put aside the state-by-state strategy and focus on a new goal. "National prohibition," its executive committee declared, "can be secured through the adoption of a constitutional amendment." By 1920, it was law. Through the first nine years of Prohibition, income taxes went a long way toward covering the federal government's costs. But just as organized Drys had backed the income tax in 1913 in order to breathe life into Prohibition, a du Pont-led group of well-financed Wets would eventually seek to kill Prohibition so that the income tax might die with it. The idea had first emerged in 1923, when the publisher of The Wall Street Journal, Clarence W. Barron, argued that ending Prohibition would enable the government to collect $2 billion a year and abolish the income tax. In 1926, Pierre du Pont's brother Irenee told an associate that General Motors would save $10 million in corporate taxes each year with the return of the alcohol levies. Irenee's specific solution -- imposition of a 3-cent tax on every glass of beer -- would, effectively, make the working poor and the unemployed finance tax relief for the rich. These plutocratic longings began to take palpable form when prosperity was upended by the Crash of 1929. The Depression corroded tax collections: federal revenue based on 1930 incomes was down 15 percent, the following year saw a 37 percent drop, and the year after that 26 percent -- a vertiginous 60 percent collapse in just three years. Capital gains taxes that had brought $1.5 billion into the Treasury from 1926 to 1929 dived into negative territory as the allowance for capital losses accrued. At the same time, the demand for government spending -- for relief, for reconstruction projects, for anything to restart the comatose economy -- soared. By 1930, the chemical du Ponts had recruited a roster of other gilt-edged names to their anti-Prohibition cause: automotive Fishers, financial Harrimans, oil Harknesses, rubber Goodriches. Their publicity campaign featured pamphlets like "What Price Prohibition?" (Answer: with the return of legal alcohol, "the necessity of levying income taxes would be eliminated") and "The Cost of Prohibition and Your Income Tax." By 1932, as the Depression plunged toward its devastating nadir, a new handout from the Association Against the Prohibition Amendment spoke more urgently to the historical moment: "The Need of a New Source of Government Revenue." The authors didn't have to look far to identify one, as Pierre du Pont made clear in a radio address that summer. "The income tax would not be necessary in the future," he said, "and half the revenue required for the budget ... would be furnished by the tax on liquor alone." That message was for public consumption; privately, he was even more direct. "The Repeal of the XVIIIth Amendment would permit federal taxation in the amount of $2 billion," du Pont wrote to a relative in April 1932, by which time the congenitally Republican industrialist had become an ardent supporter of the pro-repeal Franklin Roosevelt. "Such taxation would almost eliminate the income taxes of corporations and individuals." He didn't have to wait long to see if he was right. The repeal amendment was ratified on Dec. 5, 1933, just nine months after Roosevelt's inauguration, and new tax revenues began to flow. In the first post-repeal year, the government collected $259 million from the alcohol excise -- instantly, nearly 9 percent of total federal revenue -- even though many states either remained dry or severely limited the sale of alcohol. Unfortunately for du Pont, the other half of his equation didn't work out. Roosevelt and Congress did respond to the repeal windfall by cutting income tax rates for workers earning less than $3,000 a year. But the New Deal had little sympathy for the wealthy, whose taxes actually increased over the next few years. Rather than the trade-off du Pont expected, the government used the excise income to expand. "I acknowledge my mistake," du Pont wrote in 1936, after he and many of his colleagues had transferred their energies and financial support to the rabidly anti-Roosevelt American Liberty League. "The effort should have been directed against the XVIth Amendment" -- the income tax amendment -- "which I believe could have been repealed with the expenditure of less time and trouble than was required for the abolition of its little brother," the 18th. Prohibition had been dead for three years, but the damnable taxes Pierre du Pont had expected to die with it lived on. Contemporary Californians indulging a fantasy of income tax relief emerging from a cloud of legalized marijuana smoke should realize that it is likely only a pipe dream. - --- MAP posted-by: Richard Lake