Pubdate: Fri, 30 Jul 2010
Source: New York Times (NY)
Page: A23
Copyright: 2010 The New York Times Company
Contact:  http://www.nytimes.com/
Details: http://www.mapinc.org/media/298
Author: Gustavo A. Flores-Macias, Op-Ed Contributor
Bookmark: http://www.mapinc.org/opinion.htm (Opinion)

COLOMBIA CAN WIN MEXICO'S DRUG WAR

BOTH the United States and Mexico have approached the war on Mexican
drug cartels with Colombia in mind.

Washington's Merida Initiative, loosely modeled on its Plan Colombia
antidrug campaign from a decade ago, provides Mexico with money for
helicopters, police training and command-and-control technology. The
Mexican government, meanwhile, has taken steps to modernize its
judicial system, purge the police of corruption and improve
intelligence services.

But according to a Government Accountability Office report released
this summer, the billions of dollars spent by Mexico and the United
States over the last four years have done little to thwart Mexico's
cartels.

The problem is that the two countries have ignored a fundamental
lesson from the Colombian experience: foreign aid, security
cooperation and judicial reform were necessary but not sufficient
conditions for reducing violence. Plan Colombia succeeded because, at
the same time that it stepped up its antidrug efforts, Colombia
aggressively reformed its tax system and greatly improved government
accountability. Unless Mexico can do the same, antidrug efforts there
will fail.

Like Mexico, Colombia confronted a domestic security crisis that it
could not afford to resolve without higher tax revenues. So it created
a "wealth tax" directed at the country's richest taxpayers, earmarked
to finance the security effort.

Then, realizing that the wealthy would tolerate increased taxes only
if they believed the government was not squandering resources through
corruption or inefficiency, President Alvaro Uribe mandated that
security forces provide annual, publicly available reports on how
money is spent and how effectively it is used.

Colombia also created a civilian Ministry of Defense, making the
military accountable to democratically elected leaders. The new
ministry put the armed services under a single chain of command
directly responsible to the president and developed a cadre of
experienced civil servants.

These steps quickly led to a steadier stream of funds devoted to
antidrug efforts, more reliable security forces and, most important,
strong public support. As a result, Colombia has made significant
strides in fighting drug traffickers, guerrillas and paramilitaries:
since Mr. Uribe's election in 2002, coca production has decreased by a
third, kidnappings have dropped by 90 percent and murders have fallen
significantly.

Mexico stands to learn a valuable lesson from Colombia's experience.
At 11 percent of its gross domestic product, Mexico's tax collection
capacity ranks among the lowest in Latin American countries --
compared, for example, with Brazil's 23 percent. Without increased tax
revenues, its antidrug efforts will not be sustainable.

Mexico's security apparatus is also one of the most outdated in the
hemisphere. Like pre-reform Colombia, it lacks a civilian minister of
defense and civilian experts on military affairs, and so there is a
lack of accountability and public support for the antidrug effort.
Mexico desperately needs to reform its security agencies, something
the United States can facilitate by providing technical assistance to
strengthen Mexico's judicial and security institutions.

There is no reason Mexico can't follow Colombia's lead -- and every
reason it should, as soon as possible. President Felipe Calderon, who
has just two years before his term-limited presidency comes to an end,
hails from the right-of-center, pro-business National Action Party,
putting him in a strong position to sell tax increases to the wealthy.

Moreover, neither of the country's other two leading parties, the
centrist Institutional Revolutionary Party and the left-leaning
Democratic Revolutionary Party, shares President Calderon's tough
stance against drug cartels. This means that Mr. Calderon's successor
is unlikely to undertake major reforms.

Mr. Uribe's reforms didn't bring the Colombian drug crisis to an end
overnight. But over time, they enabled the government to get the upper
hand against the cartels. And for a country as deep in crisis as
Mexico, they offer a clear path forward.
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MAP posted-by: Richard Lake