Pubdate: Wed, 07 Mar 2012 Source: Daytona Beach News-Journal (FL) Copyright: 2012 News-Journal Corporation Contact: http://www.news-journalonline.com/ Details: http://www.mapinc.org/media/700 Authors: Raymond M. Warren and Michael Chitwood Note: Chitwood is Daytona Beach police chief. HOW FAR CAN POLICE GO? On Jan. 17, Circuit Judge Joe Will dropped drug charges against David Beauprez of Daytona Beach. The ruling came after officers testified that they had told Beauprez's mother that someone had called 911 from her home. In fact, the police were acting on an anonymous tip that there were drugs in the house. Once inside, officers testified, the mother consented to a search -- but the woman said that the police did not ask permission before they opened a drawer in which drugs and paraphernalia were found. Will found that because officers used deception to gain entry, they were not credible. Daytona Beach Police Chief Michael Chitwood, in a Feb. 21 letter, said that Will could have easily dismissed the charges without calling the officers' fundamental honesty into question. Today, we present Port Orange attorney Raymond M. Warren's defense of the judge's ruling, and Chitwood's explanation of why deception can sometimes be a crucial crime-fighting tool. Judge Was Right To Question Credibility When Judge Joseph Will recently ordered suppression of evidence seized from a home during a warrantless search, only one fact was in dispute: The officer swore he opened a drawer after gaining consent from the defendant's elderly mother. She denied being asked for that consent. Some might call this a "she said, he said" scenario, but a deeper issue was at stake. This was an "officer said, lay witness said" scenario. Will appears to have based his ruling on two points. First, the officer admitted to an out-of-court lie used to gain entry to the home. Second, the state did nothing to impeach the mother's testimony. Outraged, Daytona Beach Police Chief Michael Chitwood issued an open letter, through which he accused Will of bias and prejudice against state and federal court opinions. He also insisted that Will had found his officer's out-of-court lie to be perjurious, and he included a John Adams quote to argue, in part, that facts are stubborn things. According to Chitwood, Will "had no right to call the officers liars." I begin with a different founding father's quote. Publius, aka Alexander Hamilton, in the first Federalist Paper, asked: "Whether societies of men are really capable or not of establishing good government from reflection and choice, or whether they are forever destined to depend for their political constitutions on accident or force." In what many now term "checks and balances," the fledgling Constitution established limits on the breadth of power delegated to government. But which check will balance what delegated power? Is it Chitwood's letter, prompted by outrage? Or is it Will's order, in which he details a decision-making process? If good government is to be based on reflection and choice, who is to be empowered to reflect and choose? Can we trust a police chief to be the final arbiter of truth in a dispute between his employees and a citizen? Our Constitution refers disputes between the police and citizens to a neutral and detached judiciary. Any other form of dispute resolution would destabilize our system of checks and balances. I believe that two foundation points are in order. First, while an officer is delegated great power, his power is limited to the concept of "probable cause." An officer may swear under oath that information in a complaint affidavit establishes probable cause, and then arrest a person, but his affidavit is immediately set for review by a judge at first appearances; it is also immediately set for prosecutorial review for purposes of "proof beyond a reasonable doubt," a much higher standard. It's the start of many checks and balances on police behavior. Second, in Will's setting, when an officer elects to engage in a "knock and talk," and later performs a warrantless search of a home, the state carries the burden of proof to show that the search meets constitutional muster. With the state carrying the burden of proof, had Will been unable to decide who told the truth in a "he said, she said" scenario, he would have had to rule against the party carrying the burden of proof. If you read Will's order, look for language finding that the officer committed perjury. Will found as a factual matter that the officer, while testifying, met the criteria for impeachment. Perjury differs from impeachment. Neither of the two statutory definitions of perjury applies in Will's setting. Will found the officer's testimony less credible than the resident's testimony, which is the responsibility of any judge. I am perplexed by Chitwood's statement that Will has no right to call his officer a liar. Will, as the fact-finder, is the only person who has that right. The office of the state attorney has announced it will formally end the prosecution. The state's decision clearly shows that R. J. Larizza and his staff understand Hamilton's concept of good government by reflection and choice, as opposed to accident and force. Chitwood, on the other hand, prefers to work outside of the courtroom, in the arena of public opinion, by attacking a judge who faced a difficult choice. Either Will honors the rule of law by weighing and comparing the evidence, without bias or prejudice, or he surrenders his neutral and detached role and approves an officer's testimony over that of a lay citizen in every "officer said, lay witness said" scenario. Chitwood's braying letter permits no other option, because eventually either Judge Will or another judge will rule against an officer and Chitwood will launch another out-of-court accusation against the offending judge. Reflection and choice? Accident or force? I urge Chitwood to reconsider his choice of quote for, as John Adams surely understood, he and his brethren ensured that no one government official would ever be given unlimited power for an indeterminate period of time. Facts indeed are stubborn things. An officer admitted he had lied during his investigation of a tip, for which he lacked probable cause to obtain a search warrant. Without probable cause, without a search warrant, he still chose to create a situation out of which the burden of proof fell against him, and in favor of the accused; he made his own bed. Will did not rule in contravention of any state or federal court opinion. The state chose not to appeal. I end with language from Florida's Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases, Section 3.9 Weighing the Evidence. "You may rely upon your own conclusions about a witness. A juror may believe or disbelieve all or any part of the evidence or the testimony of any witness." Jurors, like judges, are the fact-finders in our criminal courts, not officers and certainly not chiefs of police. There exists no court in Florida in which officers are presumed more believable than any other witness, with the exception of Chitwood's court of public opinion. Perhaps this founding father's quote is more apropos: "I did not lead a revolution against George the Third in order to become George the First." The speaker? George Washington. Warren is a Port Orange defense attorney. Police Use Deception Carefully, Within Limits Over the past several weeks, I have been repeatedly asked the following questions: Why is it important for the police to use deception? Is it legal? Why use it at all? I would like to try and answer those issues. First, it is common knowledge that criminals and those who engage in criminality will, at all costs, use any means of subterfuge to avoid detection, apprehension and responsibility for their nefarious acts. The United States Supreme Court first recognized this in the 1973 case Russell v. United States, where undercover federal agents represented themselves as drug traffickers to gain incriminating evidence in a sting operation. The court recognized that the duties of the police may, at times, require limited official sanctioned deception during a criminal investigation. The court stated, "Criminal activity is such that stealth and strategy are necessary weapons in the arsenal of the police officer." Over the next 40 years, the U.S. Supreme Court and state courts have issued rulings in which the use of police deception has further evolved. Police tactics such as the use of bait cars; drug, prostitution and stolen property stings; and using the Internet to catch sexual predators are just a few examples of deception reviewed and approved by the courts. In Escobar v. State, detectives falsely told the defendant that they had obtained physical evidence linking him to the murder of a Miami police officer, which led to the defendant's confession. Law professor Jerome Skolnick is even more succinct in his article titled, "Deception by police," (originally published in the journal Criminal Justice Ethics) in which he states, "The hard reality of the criminal justice system is this: Deception is considered by the police -- and the courts as well -- to be as natural to detecting as pouncing is to a cat." Another police tactic that has evolved over the years is the "knock and talk." This tactic is normally employed when police are investigating an anonymous crime tip or hunch, pertaining to criminal activity being conducted inside a certain location. The officers knock on the door of a residence, engage the occupants in consensual conversation while explaining to the occupants the reason for their inquiry. Federal case law holds that "officers are allowed to knock on a residence's door or otherwise approach the residence seeking to speak to the inhabitants, just as any private citizen may." The operative word in this tactic is consent. Consent is one of the few legal exemptions, created by the courts, from the Fourth Amendment's requirements in the search and seizure clause. In a nutshell, consent must be obtained from the party either in verbal or written form, must be voluntary, informed and without the slightest hint of coercion or duress by police. The party being investigated has the right to refuse to give consent and can request the police obtain a warrant. In Luna-Martinez v. State, Florida's 2nd District Court of Appeals reviewed the use of deception while employing the "knock and talk" tactic to obtain consent to search their residence for contraband. The court reviewed the "totality of the circumstances" and deemed the officers' actions acceptable, admitted into evidence the contraband recovered during the search, and upheld the defendant's conviction. A recent ruling by Judge Joseph Will invoked a caustic reaction by myself because the court opined that the officers used deception to obtain consent to search a residence. He further opined that because the officers "lied" to the occupants during the knock and talk they had no credibility in his courtroom. The facts are that the officers never lied to the court; in fact, they were brutally honest in testifying to the action they took during this investigation. In Will's ruling, he continued to cast his personal aspersions on the preceding 40 years of case law allowing the use of deception during investigations without officers damaging their credibility when testifying. In my opinion, the purpose of the court is to review the actions of the police and decide if the actions of the police were legitimate or improper. If the evidence is tainted, it will be suppressed. In my view, the judge missed the target. In his recent ruling, Will's focus should have been on the police officers' using a ruse of a 9-1-1 hang-up call to solicit the defendant's mother's consent to search her residence. The court should have ruled whether this ruse was justified or overbearing. In closing, do not confuse deception with lying during court proceedings, falsifying official documents and evidence or lying during internal investigations. No police administrator would tolerate this behavior which destroys an officer's ability to perform their official duties in a moral, ethical and just manner. - --- MAP posted-by: Jay Bergstrom