Pubdate: Sat, 30 Mar 2013 Source: Ottawa Citizen (CN ON) Copyright: 2013 The Ottawa Citizen Contact: http://www.canada.com/ottawacitizen/letters.html Website: http://www.canada.com/ottawacitizen/ Details: http://www.mapinc.org/media/326 Author: Robert Muggah Note: Robert Muggah is research director of the Igarape Institute, a principal of the Secdev Group, and a professor of international relations in Brazil.) IS CANADA SERIOUS ABOUT THE AMERICAS? The Conservatives have always talked tough about organized crime in the region, but Canada's foreign-policy goals remain unclear, writes ROBERT MUGGAH. For at least the past five years, Canada has quietly waged a half hearted war on organized crime and drug cartels. Even before Canada's prolonged engagement in Afghanistan started winding down, politicians and strategists were refocusing on real and perceived threats south of the border in Latin America and the Caribbean. After decades of non-engagement, Canada launched an Americas Strategy in 2007, announcing that it would step up its diplomatic, defence and development engagement in some of the most insecure countries on the planet. This was never going to be easy: six of the top 10 most violent countries in the world are in the Western Hemisphere and for some, the situation is worsening. Although this was characterized as a war of choice, Canada was effectively drafted by the United States. The United States has long demanded that Canadians take a tougher stand against illegal drugs trafficking, gun smuggling and undocumented migrants. This is hardly surprising. The United States is the principle backer of massive anti-crime programs across the Western Hemisphere and has spent at least $14 billion since the late 1990s on the so-called Merida Initiative in Mexico, the Central American Security Initiative, the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative, Plan Colombia and a host of counter-narcotics programs. The country is also one of the biggest suppliers of weapons and deportees to Latin America and the Caribbean. By way of comparison, Canada's spending on security and justice promotion across the Americas is in the tens of millions. Canada exhibits a modest capacity to project either hard or soft power in the Americas. It has traditionally pursued many of its security and development priorities through multilateral organs such as the Organization of American States and the Inter-American Development Bank. Canada is also an active participant in the Conferences of the Defense Ministers of the Americas, having hosted a regional security summit a few years ago. During the 1980s, Canadian troops were deployed across Central America and the Caribbean to support United Nations peace support operations. Yet Canada's Conservative government has taken a hard unilateral turn in its posture toward the region. With the appointment of a minister of state for the Americas in 2008, the government signalled a concerted interest in promoting law, order and democratic governance in its backyard through a "whole-of-government" approach. Of course, Canada had other pragmatic reasons besides common security and democracy priorities to launch an Americas Strategy. The government recognizes that solidarity on the defence front might also open new business opportunities among the region's 33 countries and 590 million residents. Latin America's impressive economic growth rates are enticing to Canada's ordinarily cautious private sector. Just as successive Liberal governments made Africa a priority in the 1990s, the Harper government is today looking to the South and the Pacific, to what Jean Daudelin calls the "Liberal Americas." The prime minister toured Latin America last year while Canada's foreign minister attended the so-called Pacific Alliance whose members include Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, Peru and others. Yet Canada's heavily publicized commitment to Latin America and the Caribbean also look decidedly securitized. Prime Minister Stephen Harper has repeatedly stressed the government's commitment to using force to achieve its objectives. And while Canadian military, intelligence, policing and justice assistance to a scattering of countries in the region pales in comparison to the billions spent each year by the United States and the European Union, the government is nevertheless seeking to re-align its support toward "harder" and "inter-operable" measures. On the ground, however, there are also concerns that the Americas Strategy lacks direction and that interventions are piecemeal and disconnected. One Canadian diplomat describes it dryly as an "unfunded priority." Where Canada scores higher marks is in relation to strategic advocacy. On top of its diplomatic presence in the United States and Mexico, Canada currently fields 27 embassies and high commissions across Latin America and the Caribbean. Canada's foreign affairs and defence departments are also supporting small-scale forward operating stations to support interdiction efforts and modest training packages, though offices in Lima and Panama were recently shuttered without explanation. Canada's erstwhile aid agency also secured annual commitments of hundreds of millions a year in development assistance since the strategy was launched. Some critics question whether these investments are relevant given the massive footprint of the United States and the growing economic clout of countries across the region, particularly Brazil and Mexico, but also those outside such as China and Russia. It is worth asking whether the Canadian government or its civil society has sufficiently thought through its goals in the Americas. In spite of efforts to deepen bilateral ties in Central and South America, Canada's investments in advancing the Americas Strategy are minuscule. If it is going to move beyond rhetoric, Canada could set-up an adequately financed Americas Fund to demonstrate the seriousness of its commitment to advancing public security, economic progress and democratic governance. Canada will also need to set up a robust system to monitor and measure the outcomes of its investments, a legitimate concern in an era of austerity. What is more, at a time when many donors are rebalancing their aid portfolios to promote violence prevention and harm reduction, it appears that Canada's law and order approach may be out of touch. The Americas Strategy has to be about more than simply raising Canada's visibility in the neighbourhood. As Canada reconfigures its foreign affairs and aid agencies in 2013, it would do well to initiate an open debate on the intended objectives and outcomes of the Americas Strategy. Instead of focusing inwardly on government institutions alone, Canadians of Latin American and Caribbean descent could be enlisted into public diplomacy efforts. What is more, Canada could usefully refocus its investments in a selection of strategic partners and promote triangular and south-south partnerships in thematic and geographic areas where Canada has demonstrated value-added. While Canada will at best muddle along in Central America and Haiti, deeper involvement with regional leaders such as Brazil, Mexico, Costa Rica and Jamaica could reap diplomatic and development dividends. This is not to say that Canada should not invest in citizen security in its near abroad. Indeed, Canada could actually improve the situation by promoting the politics of peace over a war on drugs. This is especially so, given that Latin America and the Caribbean are at the epicentre of a truly progressive debate on drug policy. Countries such as Colombia, Guatemala, Mexico and Uruguay are resisting the logic of repression and changing tack. For their part, Canadians could also deliberately shift the debate from a narrow focus on the supply of drugs abroad to curbing demand at home. Canada is among the world's top consumers of a vast range of drugs fuelling violence in Latin America and the Caribbean, and many citizens are harmed by irresponsible use. Canada is also a significant producer in its own right, a fact an updated Americas Strategy would do well to consider. - --- MAP posted-by: Jo-D