Pubdate: Sat, 30 Mar 2013
Source: Ottawa Citizen (CN ON)
Copyright: 2013 The Ottawa Citizen
Contact: http://www.canada.com/ottawacitizen/letters.html
Website: http://www.canada.com/ottawacitizen/
Details: http://www.mapinc.org/media/326
Author: Robert Muggah
Note: Robert Muggah is research director of the Igarape Institute, a 
principal of the Secdev Group, and a professor of international 
relations in Brazil.)

IS CANADA SERIOUS ABOUT THE AMERICAS?

The Conservatives have always talked tough about organized crime in
the region, but Canada's foreign-policy goals remain unclear, writes
ROBERT MUGGAH.

For at least the past five years, Canada has quietly waged a half
hearted war on organized crime and drug cartels. Even before Canada's
prolonged engagement in Afghanistan started winding down, politicians
and strategists were refocusing on real and perceived threats south of
the border in Latin America and the Caribbean. After decades of
non-engagement, Canada launched an Americas Strategy in 2007,
announcing that it would step up its diplomatic, defence and
development engagement in some of the most insecure countries on the
planet. This was never going to be easy: six of the top 10 most
violent countries in the world are in the Western Hemisphere and for
some, the situation is worsening.

Although this was characterized as a war of choice, Canada was
effectively drafted by the United States. The United States has long
demanded that Canadians take a tougher stand against illegal drugs
trafficking, gun smuggling and undocumented migrants. This is hardly
surprising. The United States is the principle backer of massive
anti-crime programs across the Western Hemisphere and has spent at
least $14 billion since the late 1990s on the so-called Merida
Initiative in Mexico, the Central American Security Initiative, the
Caribbean Basin Security Initiative, Plan Colombia and a host of
counter-narcotics programs. The country is also one of the biggest
suppliers of weapons and deportees to Latin America and the Caribbean.
By way of comparison, Canada's spending on security and justice
promotion across the Americas is in the tens of millions.

Canada exhibits a modest capacity to project either hard or soft power
in the Americas. It has traditionally pursued many of its security and
development priorities through multilateral organs such as the
Organization of American States and the Inter-American Development
Bank. Canada is also an active participant in the Conferences of the
Defense Ministers of the Americas, having hosted a regional security
summit a few years ago. During the 1980s, Canadian troops were
deployed across Central America and the Caribbean to support United
Nations peace support operations. Yet Canada's Conservative government
has taken a hard unilateral turn in its posture toward the region.
With the appointment of a minister of state for the Americas in 2008,
the government signalled a concerted interest in promoting law, order
and democratic governance in its backyard through a
"whole-of-government" approach.

Of course, Canada had other pragmatic reasons besides common security
and democracy priorities to launch an Americas Strategy. The
government recognizes that solidarity on the defence front might also
open new business opportunities among the region's 33 countries and
590 million residents. Latin America's impressive economic growth
rates are enticing to Canada's ordinarily cautious private sector.
Just as successive Liberal governments made Africa a priority in the
1990s, the Harper government is today looking to the South and the
Pacific, to what Jean Daudelin calls the "Liberal Americas." The prime
minister toured Latin America last year while Canada's foreign
minister attended the so-called Pacific Alliance whose members include
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, Peru and others.

Yet Canada's heavily publicized commitment to Latin America and the
Caribbean also look decidedly securitized. Prime Minister Stephen
Harper has repeatedly stressed the government's commitment to using
force to achieve its objectives. And while Canadian military,
intelligence, policing and justice assistance to a scattering of
countries in the region pales in comparison to the billions spent each
year by the United States and the European Union, the government is
nevertheless seeking to re-align its support toward "harder" and
"inter-operable" measures. On the ground, however, there are also
concerns that the Americas Strategy lacks direction and that
interventions are piecemeal and disconnected. One Canadian diplomat
describes it dryly as an "unfunded priority."

Where Canada scores higher marks is in relation to strategic advocacy.
On top of its diplomatic presence in the United States and Mexico,
Canada currently fields 27 embassies and high commissions across Latin
America and the Caribbean. Canada's foreign affairs and defence
departments are also supporting small-scale forward operating stations
to support interdiction efforts and modest training packages, though
offices in Lima and Panama were recently shuttered without
explanation. Canada's erstwhile aid agency also secured annual
commitments of hundreds of millions a year in development assistance
since the strategy was launched. Some critics question whether these
investments are relevant given the massive footprint of the United
States and the growing economic clout of countries across the region,
particularly Brazil and Mexico, but also those outside such as China
and Russia.

It is worth asking whether the Canadian government or its civil
society has sufficiently thought through its goals in the Americas.

In spite of efforts to deepen bilateral ties in Central and South
America, Canada's investments in advancing the Americas Strategy are
minuscule. If it is going to move beyond rhetoric, Canada could set-up
an adequately financed Americas Fund to demonstrate the seriousness of
its commitment to advancing public security, economic progress and
democratic governance. Canada will also need to set up a robust system
to monitor and measure the outcomes of its investments, a legitimate
concern in an era of austerity. What is more, at a time when many
donors are rebalancing their aid portfolios to promote violence
prevention and harm reduction, it appears that Canada's law and order
approach may be out of touch. The Americas Strategy has to be about
more than simply raising Canada's visibility in the
neighbourhood.

As Canada reconfigures its foreign affairs and aid agencies in 2013,
it would do well to initiate an open debate on the intended objectives
and outcomes of the Americas Strategy.

Instead of focusing inwardly on government institutions alone,
Canadians of Latin American and Caribbean descent could be enlisted
into public diplomacy efforts. What is more, Canada could usefully
refocus its investments in a selection of strategic partners and
promote triangular and south-south partnerships in thematic and
geographic areas where Canada has demonstrated value-added. While
Canada will at best muddle along in Central America and Haiti, deeper
involvement with regional leaders such as Brazil, Mexico, Costa Rica
and Jamaica could reap diplomatic and development dividends.

This is not to say that Canada should not invest in citizen security
in its near abroad. Indeed, Canada could actually improve the
situation by promoting the politics of peace over a war on drugs. This
is especially so, given that Latin America and the Caribbean are at
the epicentre of a truly progressive debate on drug policy. Countries
such as Colombia, Guatemala, Mexico and Uruguay are resisting the
logic of repression and changing tack. For their part, Canadians could
also deliberately shift the debate from a narrow focus on the supply
of drugs abroad to curbing demand at home.

Canada is among the world's top consumers of a vast range of drugs
fuelling violence in Latin America and the Caribbean, and many
citizens are harmed by irresponsible use. Canada is also a significant
producer in its own right, a fact an updated Americas Strategy would
do well to consider. 
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MAP posted-by: Jo-D