Pubdate: Wed, 15 May 2013
Source: Washington Post (DC)
Copyright: 2013 The Washington Post Company
Contact: http://mapinc.org/url/mUgeOPdZ
Website: http://www.washingtonpost.com/
Details: http://www.mapinc.org/media/491
Author: Nick Miroff

IN MEXICO, A DIFFERENT KIND OF DRUG WAR

The New President's Decision to Rein in U.S. Agents Spurs Dismay in 
Washington, Highlighting Divisions Over Goals and Costs

MEXICO CITY - The recent changes ordered by new President Enrique 
Pena Nieto to Mexico's anti-narcotics partnership with the United 
States have produced markedly different reactions here and in 
Washington, underscoring what appear to be diverging perceptions of 
the drug war's goals and the costs of fighting it.

Pena Nieto's decision to limit the ability of American agents to 
operate in Mexico has been met with dismay by U.S. law enforcement 
agencies, which left a heavy footprint under the previous 
administration of Felipe Calderon. They warn that intelligence 
sharing will suffer if they can no longer choose which Mexican force 
- - the army, navy or federal police - to give sensitive information 
to; they've been instructed to now funnel everything through Mexico's 
Interior Ministry instead.

The agents also caution that the personal relationships developed 
under Calderon will fray if they are no longer welcome to work side 
by side with trusted partners at sites such as the joint command 
centers where Americans helped spy on Mexican narcotics traffickers 
and direct operations against them.

Yet here on the southern side of the fight, where gangland violence 
has taken 60,000 to 90,000 lives in the past six years, there is 
little surprise that Pena Nieto would move to reformat the 
relationship. It is a change that has been coming for a long time.

Standing opposite President Obama at a news conference here May 2 
during the U.S. president's recent visit, Pena Nieto insisted that 
drug war cooperation would remain robust but that Mexico wants a more 
"efficient" strategy.

"Let me say it very clearly," he said. "Under this new strategy, 
we're going to order things up. We're going to make it institutional. 
The channels will be very clear. We're going to use one single 
channel in order to be more efficient, to attain better results."

It is the meaning of "better results" that the two countries 
increasingly differ on.

Seeking change

Seizing dope and smashing cartels were the shared goals for Mexico 
and the United States under Calderon. He allowed U.S. agencies 
unprecedented latitude to gather intelligence on drug cartel suspects 
and decide which Mexican security forces were trustworthy and 
effective enough to share it with. To safeguard against the 
gangsters' corrupting powers, the Americans developed "vetted" units 
of elite drug-war fighters, relying heavily on Mexico's marines to be 
a lethal strike force against high-level targets.

But the flow of drugs north and the death toll in Mexico remained 
virtually undiminished as fallen mafia capos were quickly replaced by 
new leaders and the troubles of the border region spread south.

Frustrated Mexicans were looking for a change, and on the campaign 
stump last year and since taking office in December, Pena Nieto 
pledged that "reducing violence" would become his overarching 
security goal. In private, his aides characterized the Calderon years 
as a free-for-all that put tens of thousands of troops on the streets 
but didn't make Mexico safer.

Pena Nieto's changes to U.S. security cooperation generated little 
news media attention here, and the president's political rivals have 
been quiet, as well. Nor has there been controversy over Pena Nieto's 
plans to recast the Merida Initiative, the $1.9 billion U.S. security 
aid package signed by Calderon. It will shift from supplying Mexico 
with military hardware and training to strengthening the country's 
dysfunctional criminal justice system and preventing violence via 
social programs.

Pena Nieto eventually plans to send Mexican troops back to the 
barracks and gradually replace them with a paramilitary-style 
national police force modeled after France's National Gendarmerie. 
But it may take years for the new force to be ready.

His move to rein in American agents has been mostly depicted by 
analysts in terms of Mexican nationalism, consistent with the legacy 
of Pena Nieto's Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), which ruled 
Mexico for most of the 20th century.

"The PRI has always had misgivings about Uncle Sam, and every new PRI 
president has tried to diminish dependence on the U.S.," said George 
Grayson, a Mexico scholar who has written extensively about the drug 
war. "It is traditional PRI nationalism and shouldn't surprise 
anyone," he said.

But Pena Nieto officials argue that the centralization of 
intelligence sharing is a common-sense move intended to streamline 
coordination among its security forces. And although U.S. officials 
worked more closely than ever with Mexican counterparts under 
Calderon, the relationship took several bruises.

Among the more trust-damaging was the botched gun-walking scheme 
dubbed Fast and Furious and other U.S. operations like it, which let 
hundreds of illegal firearms fall into the hands of Mexican 
gangsters. American agents also ended up sowing division among 
Mexico's security forces by seeming to favor the marines over its 
army and federal police.

A possible chill

The new protocols mean that the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, 
CIA and other agencies can no longer bypass Mexico's central 
government to work directly with their trusted military contacts to 
pass along tips on the whereabouts of cartel targets.

American officials say that will put a deep chill on cooperation, and 
they have raised doubts about Pena Nieto's will to carry forward with 
the fight.

But a former high-ranking U.S. military officer who worked with 
Mexico for years said the move is consistent with Pena Nieto's 
longer-term strategy of demilitarizing Mexican law enforcement and 
rerouting civilian intelligence away from the armed forces, which 
have been strained by a crime-fighting role they were never trained for.

The former commander also said that military-to-military ties between 
the United States and Mexico are likely to remain as strong as ever 
and that intelligence generated by the U.S. military on the 
whereabouts of drug shipments and narcotics traffickers can still be 
shared with Mexican armed forces under existing agreements.

What will be different, he said, is that U.S. civilian agencies such 
as the DEA or CIA won't be allowed to work directly with Mexico's 
military. He spoke on the condition of anonymity because he still 
works in the region.

In public remarks made during his recent visit to Mexico, Obama 
struck a deferential tone. "It is obviously up to the Mexican people 
to determine their security structures and how it engages with other 
nations, including the United States," he said.

Alejandro Hope, an analyst and ex-Mexican intelligence official, 
predicted that Pena Nieto and his allies might fall back on the 
Calderon strategy if their approach does not produce swift dividends. 
"Once they don't get the reduction they promised, they're going to 
need more help from the U.S.," Hope said. "And a year from now, it's 
going to cost them even more."
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MAP posted-by: Jay Bergstrom