Pubdate: Fri, 26 Jul 2013
Source: Los Angeles Times (CA)
Copyright: 2013 Los Angeles Times
Contact:  http://www.latimes.com/
Details: http://www.mapinc.org/media/248
Author: Ricardo Ainslie
Note: Ricardo Ainslie, a native of Mexico City, is the author of "The 
Fight to Save Juarez: Life in the Heart of Mexico's Drug War." He is 
a psychoanalyst and a professor of education at the University of 
Texas at Austin.

MEXICO'S 'NEW' DRUG WAR

President Pena Nieto's Strategy Is a Lot Like His Predecessor's. for 
Obvious Reasons.

Last week, Mexican authorities arrested Miguel Angel Trevino Morales, 
the leader of the Zetas, Mexico's deadliest and most feared drug 
cartel. In Mexico, the news was met with relief, although there is 
also apprehension that his arrest will lead to a convulsion of 
violence; historically, taking out cartel kingpins has meant power 
struggles within organized crime groups, schisms that leave many dead 
in their wake.

Trevino Morales, known as Z-40, was apprehended - along with a 
bodyguard and a third man, reported to be the cartel's accountant - 
without a shot being fired as he traveled along a back road near 
Nuevo Laredo and the U.S. border.

For observers of the Mexican drug war, his arrest provides an 
unanticipated window into how President Enrique Pena Nieto will 
address his nation's entrenched organized crime problem.

 From the beginning of his presidential campaign, Pena Nieto, who 
assumed office in December 2012, vowed a different approach to the 
drug war from that of his predecessor, Felipe Calderon. Calderon's 
frontal assault, though initially popular, very soon became the 
object of criticism as violence soared. Last summer, the electorate 
handed Pena Nieto a decisive victory over Calderon's party, the PAN. 
Having suffered about 70,000 deaths (a conservative estimate) over 
the course of Calderon's presidency, the country was exhausted by the 
violence, anxious for change.

Calderon pursued a kingpin strategy: Drawing from American 
counterinsurgency tactics developed in Iraq, his administration 
declared war on a list of 37 most-wanted cartel operatives. In 
contrast, many Mexicans believed Pena Nieto would negotiate a peace 
agreement with the cartels, allowing them free rein in exchange for 
ending the violence. In addition, Pena Nieto signaled that he might 
be reevaluating Mexico's close cooperation with American law 
enforcement in the drug war.

The arrest of Z-40 would seem to prove those notions wrong. Within 
days, the national director of Calderon's party accused Pena Nieto of 
disingenuously building expectations of a new approach when, for all 
practical purposes, he was continuing Calderon's tactics. Indeed, the 
arrest had all the familiar hallmarks: Trevino Morales' moves were 
tracked in real time by a U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
drone, while American intelligence monitored his communications and 
shared what was learned with Mexican authorities.

Pragmatism may be one explanation for Pena Nieto's decision not to 
jettison the kingpin strategy altogether. His administration simply 
could not ignore that Mexico's drug cartels are criminal 
organizations that not only operate an international drug trade but 
also commit brutal acts against ordinary Mexican citizens on a daily 
basis, including kidnapping, human trafficking and extortion - on a 
massive level - of individuals and businesses. The Zetas, in 
particular, are infamous for having a "diversified business plan" 
when it comes to criminal activity.

For Pena Nieto - and Mexicans tired of the violence created by the 
government crackdown - it is one thing to entertain a 
live-and-let-live strategy toward the cartels when their primary 
activities are understood to revolve around servicing the high demand 
for drugs in the U.S. However, that strategy is no solution if 
Mexicans continue to be victimized in the absence of government 
protection in their communities.

It is also likely that Pena Nieto was presented with a politically 
awkward choice visa-vis the United States. The Mexican president 
apparently faced incontrovertible evidence from U.S. sources 
indicating that the head of Mexico's most feared cartel was, 
literally, in their sights. To have not acted on that intelligence 
would have certainly raised speculation that the Pena Nieto 
government was protecting Z-40, which wouldn't have played well at 
home or helped in negotiating a new relationship with Washington.

Still, it would be a mistake for Pena Nieto to simply pick up where 
Calderon left off. The previous administration overemphasized a 
militarized law enforcement strategy, only belatedly looking at the 
social conditions that helped create a culture that allowed the 
cartels to thrive (lessons important in tamping down cartel violence 
in Colombia and Brazil).

That said, the kingpin strategy is not going to go away. There is no 
sign that the U.S. will end its intelligence work in Mexico, with or 
without overt cooperation from Mexican authorities, and the U.S. will 
undoubtedly continue to exert pressure on those officials to act on 
that intelligence. But so will everyday Mexicans, with their 
sometimes conf licting needs for peace and protection. In Mexico's 
budding if imperfect democracy, the latter pressures can no longer be ignored.
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MAP posted-by: Jay Bergstrom