Pubdate: Thu, 13 Mar 2014
Source: Reno News & Review (NV)
Copyright: 2014, Chico Community Publishing, Inc.
Contact:  http://www.newsreview.com/issues/reno/
Details: http://www.mapinc.org/media/2524
Author: Dennis Myers

FAILED EXPERIMENT

Nevada Made Medical Marijuana Legal in 1979. It Lasted Eight
Years.

In 1971, a young Florida fellow named Robert Randall moved to
Washington, D.C., hoping to make his way as a political speechwriter.
He would end up making more history than most of the politicians in
D.C.

Troubled by difficulty focusing his eyes in 1972-he was not yet 25-he
went to an ophthalmologist who told him he had advanced open angle
glaucoma-pressure inside the eyeball that pinches the optic nerve. The
doctor told him he had "three to five years of remaining sight" and
would be blind at age 30.

Randall began taking prescribed medications. They did not stave off
haloes around light sources, milky vision, and periods of temporary
blindness.

Then suddenly Randall's condition improved dramatically. His doctor
could not explain it. Randall did not tell him that he had, on a
friend's recommendation, begun smoking pot. The friend gave him a
joint and Randall smoked it one night. Walking from living room to
kitchen a few minutes later, he glanced out a window. "What I saw
stopped me in my tracks," he later wrote. "Actually, it was what I
didn't see that stopped me. The haloes around the nearby streetlight
were gone."

He resisted the idea that marijuana is medicine. It went against
everything he had heard from government all his life. He stopped using
marijuana. The symptoms returned. He started smoking it again. The
symptoms dwindled. By 1974 trial and error convinced him. (Randall
always continued legal medication along with the marijuana therapy.)

Obtaining marijuana was a problem, with a return of pain and near
sightlessness accompanying lack of supply. He began growing four
plants at home and was prosecuted. Randall could have paid a fine and
moved on but decided to fight, pleading innocent on grounds of medical
necessity. His lawyer told him to prove it.

Randall's quest for proof determined the trajectory of the rest of his
life and made the federal government very sorry. An acquaintance gave
him the names of several federal officials in the health field. When
he contacted them, most knew of the health benefits of marijuana,
including reduction of pressure within the eye. Some even
congratulated him on finding out the truth. One gave him an annual
report to Congress, Marijuana and Health Report, for 1974, that
spelled it all out. Randall was infuriated. "Without marijuana I would
go blind," he later wrote of this experience. "Hell, the entire drug
control bureaucracy knew that." Repeatedly over the years, that
bureaucracy by its actions, and members of Congress by their votes,
told Randall and other sufferers: Go blind.

"It was understandable that a pro-pot lobby would make whatever claims
possible," he wrote. "But to find that federal agencies knew, had
known for five years, was staggering."

At times Randall went off marijuana, relying solely on legal
medication as part of research for which he was recruited at the
University of North Carolina and University of California, Los
Angeles. The result of new drugs was always negative. Sometimes a
drug's effect was exactly what it was intended to prevent-periods of
total blindness. The findings of the scientists became a part of the
court record.

Randall won his case. The judge, who had gone deeply into marijuana
research, ruled, "The evil he sought to prevent, blindness, is greater
than that he performed to accomplish it, growing marijuana in his
residence in violation of D.C. Code."

The next phase

Randall petitioned for marijuana from the federal farm in Mississippi.
After jumping through all the hoops, he was grudgingly approved to
receive legal marijuana and became the only legal pot smoker in the
United States.

Prohibition of marijuana is a relatively recent development. It was
enacted by Congress in 1937 over the objections of the American
Medical Association. The bill contained an exception for medical use,
but gradually the feds leaned on the medical community-which
yielded-to stop using it as medicine, mainly then an analgesic.
Subsequently, research demonstrated additional uses for marijuana in
treating maladies from glaucoma to cholera, though the United
States-given its prohibition-was not until recently on the cutting
edge of that kind of research. Just this year, Science Direct
published a paper by Chinese and New York scientists that found
cannabis "can prevent acute alcohol-induced liver steatosis" in
laboratory animals.

The climate of the 1970s was congenial to Randall's activism. Richard
Nixon, who launched his own drug war, was gone, though his
legacy-increased drug use as a result of accelerated enforcement of
prohibition-lingered on. President Gerald Ford adopted a saner
approach to drugs, leaving a White House drug "czar" office created by
Congress vacant. He deemphasized enforcement in favor of treatment. He
was followed into the White House by Jimmy Carter, who followed a
similar softer policy until he needed some political cover, whereupon
Carter staffed the drug office and got tough.

Randall set about helping fellow glaucoma patients, then victims of
other maladies as he learned more about marijuana's wider value as a
virtual wonder drug. He immersed himself in the issue of medical
marijuana, becoming something of a lay expert, producing half a dozen
books like Muscle Spasm, Pain, and Marijuana Therapy (Galen Press,
1991).

Randall joined a petition to the Drug Enforcement Administration for
reclassification of marijuana. As in the case of his criminal trial,
he found that if someone could be coaxed into examining the research
with an open mind, the verdict was assured. DEA administrative law
judge Francis Young spent two years holding hearings and studying the
research, then ruled in 1988, "Marijuana in its natural form is one of
the safest therapeutically active substances known to man. ...
Uncontroverted evidence in this record indicates that marijuana was
being used therapeutically by mankind 2000 years before the Birth of
Christ. ... [T]he marijuana plant ... has a currently accepted medical
use in the United States." The DEA ignored it.

Along the way, Randall was tireless. Early on, in the late 1970s and
early '80s, a number of states made medical use of marijuana legal.
New Mexico was the first, in 1978, and Randall was deeply involved, as
he was in other states, either in person or on paper. He was like the
Johnny Appleseed of medical marijuana.

Then the effort moved to Nevada.

Silver state trial

The measure was Senate Bill 470 of the 1979 Nevada Legislature. No one
was brave enough to sponsor it, so it was given a committee
introduction. To provide further political protection, patients would
be using marijuana under the guise of research-most states used a
similar subterfuge-along with all kinds of regulation and bureaucracy
that, as it turned out, kept the program from working well. The bill
established "a program to research the therapeutic effects of
marihuana on certain patients; establishing a board of review for the
program; requiring ... regulations for the program; establishing
requirements for admission in the program; authorizing the health
division to contract to receive marihuana." (Until the Reagan
administration, the federal government perversely spelled marijuana's
name with an H, and state legislatures had to follow suit.) Research
in marijuana had been stymied by the federal government for decades.
Soon more than 25 states put on their scientist caps and got in the
business-though few scholarly papers resulted.

In something of a mockery of the serious needs of patients, approval
of the Nevada measure was fueled not just by the science and the
efficacy of the drug but by two politicians who opposed marijuana
until their own personal interests became engaged. Conservative
Democrat and state court judge Keith Hayes and conservative Republican
and former state senator James Slattery had little use for the drug
until Hayes contracted cancer and Slattery's wife developed glaucoma.

"However, if it appeared to [be] medically appropriate, I would
consider smoking it, but it would be a cultural departure for me,"
Hayes told reporter Tricia White. He said his changed view was driven
by the agony of chemotherapy.

The two men became lobbyists for medical marijuana. Unfortunately,
they were unsophisticated about it. At an April 27 hearing, asked if
the bill would allow pot smoking, Hayes told the legislators that the
medicine used would ideally be in tablet form, if such was available.

This was a notion federal drug warriors-desperate to block the spread
of medical marijuana-had been pushing, that THC (an active ingredient
in marijuana) could be made into a pill. Drug companies had no
interest in distributing it for the feds and approval through the Food
and Drug Administration moved slowly, but the big problem was that it
didn't work effectively.

It was eventually approved for several uses, including nausea and
vomiting of patients undergoing chemotherapy. But its effect hit the
body with a jolt compared to the gradual absorption of smoked
marijuana that patients could control, a critical problem for an
anti-nausea drug. Randall was fond of saying, "Who, but a bureaucrat,
would be dumb enough to give a vomiting patient a pill?" This was an
anti-nausea medication that could cause nausea, a neat match for that
anti-glaucoma medicine that had temporarily blinded Randall. Hayes was
not speaking for informed patients but lawmakers were responsive to
him (he had previously chaired Assembly Judiciary).

As it happened, at that same hearing where Hayes spoke, a letter from
Randall-who could not attend in person-was presented to the committee,
and it warned against exactly the technique Hayes promoted.

"The only flaw in the [Nevada bill's] approach is, I think, in the
proposed legislation's neglect of organic cannabis preparations in
favor of synthetic marijuana-like substances," Randall wrote.

"I cannot emphasize enough the dangers which reliance on synthetic
cannabis poses. ... Delta-9-THC, the preparation of synthetic
marijuana now available ... is not marijuana's most therapeutically
active substance, but merely its most psycho-active. ...Evidence
suggests Delta-9-THC is effective in some cases. This is also true for
both glaucoma control and as an anti-emetic. Yet the evidence also
indicates that the oral preparations of Delta-9-THC are inferior to
marijuana in smoked form. In a recent study conducted by the National
Cancer Institute, 15 cancer chemotherapy patients were tested.
Initially, all were placed on oral Delta-9-THC. At the conclusion of
the study, however, all patients had been transferred to smoked
marijuana. In effect, Delta-9-THC became ineffective while the
federally-developed, dose controlled cigarettes continued to offer
relief."

Randall enclosed a Cancer Institute memo on the issue and also urged
the lawmakers to protect patients from "the Hobson's choice between
medical relief and criminality."

The Nevada Medical Association, a Clark County prosecutor, and others
endorsed the legislation. It was approved by both houses-both had
Democratic majorities-and signed by Republican Gov. Robert List. The
final legislation was silent on how the treatment was to be applied,
by pill or joint, and it allowed the Nevada Board of Health to extend
the program beyond cancer and glaucoma if it chose.

Obstacles

The program went into effect with a budget of less than $32,000, most
of it for start-up costs like new office furniture and travel to
states with similar programs for planning purposes. No state workers
were added and the program was housed in the already existing state
Health Division.

The program was swaddled in bureaucracy designed to further protect
the legislators, with the result that patients were discouraged from
using it. The process of qualifying for the program was complicated,
so using traditional access to marijuana was simpler and faster-and
pain or blindness doesn't wait.

Just as detrimental was the election of Ronald Reagan as president the
year after the Nevada program was created.

Since Virginia City enacted the nation's first anti-drug law in 1876
as a result of racism, bad journalism, and political exclusion of
health professionals, manufacturing anti-drug hysterias had become a
United States tradition, and in the 20th century evolving public
relations techniques took those panics national. The Hearst press and
federal official Harry Anslinger-the J. Edgar Hoover of drug
prohibition-had been the biggest ringmasters, but in the second half
of the century, presidents launched scares-first Lyndon Johnson, who
had moderate success; then Richard Nixon, who popularized the term
"war on drugs"; then Reagan; and finally the first George Bush.

The result was that each time drug scares died down and more sensible
policies came to the fore, another hysteria was launched, and the real
experts were driven into the background.

Initially, after Reagan took office, the spread of medical marijuana
continued-more than 30 states were on board. But the notion that
Reagan was as benign on drugs as Ford and Carter ended on Oct. 2,
1982. The skills of his handlers in manipulating public opinion
created the most damaging hysteria to date. A month before the midterm
elections, with his poll numbers sagging and Republicans speculating
he might not run for a second term, Reagan revived the drug war in a
radio address:

"We're making no excuses for drugs-hard, soft or otherwise. Drugs are
bad, and we're going after them. As I've said before, we've taken down
the surrender flag and run up the battle flag. And we're going to win
the war on drugs."

The power of a president to influence public opinion was never more
apparent. What followed was an orgy of attacks on rights. Democrats
cowered, the press offered no scrutiny, and the courts winked as
Congress passed and the president signed measures that weakened
private property rights and allowed the military to be employed inside
the nation in combating drugs. Hoary and discredited fables about
drugs like the marijuana gateway theory came roaring back.
Legislatures stopped approving medical marijuana programs. Surveys
showed parents willing to turn in their children for drug offenses.
Employers drug-tested workers.

In this punitive environment, few people wanted to sign up for state
marijuana programs and state governments had no interest in
publicizing them. Few people knew Nevada had one. It's not clear
whether even Slattery or Hayes used it.

In 1987 the Nevada Legislature repealed the program as part of a
larger bill dealing with pharmacies and drugs. The repeal received
little attention. State pharmacy board lobbyist Joe Midmore told an
Assembly committee, "There is a new drug on the market which is a
synthetic form of marihuana, so statutes dealing with legal use of it
are no longer required. ... [T]he doctor had to present a case to a
special board, which either approved or denied the request. After
discussing this with [the] state health officer and others, it was
decided to request repeal of this law." (This is a characterization of
Midmore's remarks in the minutes, not a direct quote.) He did not
identify who made that decision or who engaged in the discussion. Nor
did he or anyone else tell the lawmakers of the problems with THC pills.

Before a Senate committee, Midmore called the bill merely a
"housekeeping bill." No legislator in either house asked any
questions. Gov. Robert Miller signed it on June 11.

When Reagan left office, his successor George H.W. Bush stepped up.
The Reagan hysteria was child's play compared to the madness unleashed
by the new president, and Democrats and journalists were even more
culpable this time. The White House advanced an approaching nationally
televised speech by telling journalists its topic, and the television
industry took over from there. In the two and a half weeks before the
speech, the networks ran about three drug stories a night, with four
stories a night the week before the speech. None of these scrutinized
the value of punitive policies. By the time Bush spoke, the public was
primed.

"This is crack cocaine," Bush said in his Sept. 5 speech. "[It was]
seized a few days ago in a park across the street from the White
House. ... It could easily have been heroin or PCP." (It was later
learned that the seller actually operated elsewhere but was lured by
agents to Lafayette Park to make the buy more dramatic.)

A new attack on rights began. The military's role was expanded.
Political candidates urinated in bathrooms and emerged to display
their samples for cameras, a ritual known as "jar wars." If under
Reagan parents were willing to turn in their children, under Bush
children turned in their parents. Extreme and racist sentencing was
made mandatory. Democrats as an opposition simply melted, with Sen.
Joe Biden calling Bush soft on drugs-"not tough enough, bold enough,
or imaginative enough."

The drug war went on, under Clinton and the second George Bush,
neither of whom offered alternatives to punitive enforcement. Juries
began refusing to convict and voters began asserting themselves.

In 2000, Nevadan voted to create a medical marijuana program. The new
program, too, posed as a research effort. For several years, state
legislators dragged their feet at implementing the law by making the
substance difficult to obtain. When the legislature finally got on
board, local officials became the problem. Whether voters will prevail
is still to be decided.

Over the course of the Reagan-Bush/Republican-Democratic efforts
against drugs, illicit drugs became a major industry. Rights that were
hard won over the centuries from Runnymede (Magna Carta) to Federal
Hall in New York (Bill of Rights) were damaged. Only when, as in the
case of alcohol prohibition, the public began reasserting itself did
the drug war slow.

The hysterias set off by presidents with the support of the press and
the acquiescence of the opposition made it clear that more sensible
drug policies can be reversed at any time by another manipulative
president, a collaborationist Congress, and weak journalism and
judges. This is one of those periods of relative sanity and
prohibition opponents should not assume it will continue. They need to
be ready to provide the opposition the political system does not.

There are now 20 states with voter-created medical marijuana programs,
though some had have to pass them twice to overcome the resistance of
politicians.

Randall died June 2, 2001, in Florida. He is now sometimes called the
founding father of the medical marijuana movement. But many
politicians are still telling such patients: Go blind. Suffer. Drop
dead.

[sidebar]

To read the decision by Drug Enforcement Administration judge Francis
Young, go to www.druglibrary.org/olsen/medical/young/young1.html 
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MAP posted-by: Jo-D