Pubdate: Sun, 19 Jul 2015 Source: San Diego Union Tribune (CA) Copyright: 2015 Union-Tribune Publishing Co. Contact: http://www.utsandiego.com/ Details: http://www.mapinc.org/media/386 Note: Seldom prints LTEs from outside it's circulation area. Author: By David A. Shirk Note: Shirk directs the Master's Program in International Relations and the Justice in Mexico Program (www.justiceinmexico.org) DRUGLORD'S ESCAPE SHOULD LEAD TO BETTER U.S.-MEXICO COOPERATION The capture of Joaquin "El Chapo (Shorty)" Guzman in February 2014 was lauded at home and abroad as one of the most important accomplishments of Mexican President Enrique Pena Nieto, who restored Mexico's longtime ruling party to power after a 12-year hiatus. However, on July 11, 2015, Guzman escaped from Mexico's top maximum-security prison. Now, one of Pena Nieto's greatest feats is widely seen as his greatest failure, and a possible setback to U.S.-Mexico relations. Since Guzman's escape through a 1.5-kilometer ventilated tunnel, pundits are debating who is to blame and what comes next in the fight against Mexican organized crime. Because Guzman escaped a previous prison stint in 2001, Pena Nieto had pledged to prevent another jailbreak, saying this would be utterly "unforgivable." Now, Guzman's "elective departure" is clearly just one more illustration of the institutional weakness of Mexico's criminal justice system. Despite years of effort, Mexico's much-anticipated judicial reforms won't go into full effect nationally until 2016, and may require another decade or more to bear fruit. Guzman's escape thus underscores that a long-term commitment to reforming the administration of justice remains a priority. In particular, as Mexico's prisons require swift and careful attention to prevent similar jailbreaks and mayhem. Of course, we knew all this when Guzman was rearrested, which is why many analysts myself included pushed for Guzman's extradition to the United States. Simply put, because of the power and impunity they have at home, extradition is often the only surefire endgame to a drug trafficker's career, short of death. Yet despite criticisms of Mexican foot-dragging, the formal U.S. request package for extradition was completed just weeks before Guzman's escape. Subsequent technical, legal and administrative complications would have delayed Guzman's extradition for years, as was the case for the extraditions of Osiel Cardenas Guillen in 2007, Mario Villanueva in 2010 and Benjamin Arellano Felix in 2011. Thus, to be effective, a more streamlined U.S.-Mexico extradition process is clearly needed. Meanwhile, Guzman's escape clearly adds further uncertainty to Mexico's already unpredictable security situation, which had seemed to improve in recent years. Will Guzman go quietly into retirement, get back into business, and/or spark a new wave of violence against those responsible for his capture? Whatever his next move, what will U.S. and Mexican officials do in the face of such a serious setback? Here, Colombia's experience is worth noting, given parallels to the 1992 escape of Pablo Escobar, once the world's "most notorious drug trafficker." Escobar's 1991 surrender was negotiated by Colombian President Cesar Gaviria's government. Many suspect that Guzman's capture was similarly negotiated (albeit clandestinely) to appease U.S. officials. This seems doubtful, since a pact to temporarily detain Guzman would be a terrible deal for Pena Nieto. It would be more politically damaging to catch Guzman and let him go than to never capture him at all. In Colombia, though, the embarrassment over Escobar's escape made him the subject of an intense U.S.-Colombian manhunt that led to his killing a year and a half later. Guzman's escape could and should prompt a renewed sense of urgency for U.S.-Mexican cooperation in both countries. Since 2007, the mechanism for such cooperation has been the Merida Initiative, a nearly $300 million-$400 million annual U.S. assistance package somewhat similar to Plan Colombia. While much Merida funding supports law enforcement activities, some also supports criminal justice reform. For example, the University of San Diego's Justice in Mexico program currently receives Merida funding to prepare Mexican law schools for the transition to oral, adversarial trial procedures next year. Yet in recent years, official enthusiasm for the Merida Initiative has faded. In Mexico, the Pena Nieto administration appeared wary about the level of U.S. influence permitted under President Felipe Calderon (2006-12). At the same time, many U.S. officials have appeared to lose their interest and sense of urgency for continued funding of the program, due partly to ongoing concerns about corruption in Mexico, getaways by other major organized crime figures (like Rafael Caro Quintero), and human rights abuses in Mexico, including the 2015 Tlatlaya and Ayotzinapa massacres. It will be up to Roberta Jacobson a career diplomat, longtime steward of the Merida Initiative, and Obama's current nominee for U.S. ambassador to Mexico to make the case for continued and better U.S.-Mexico cooperation. If there is to be hope for getting "Shorty" again and getting U.S.-Mexico cooperation back on track the U.S. Senate must move swiftly to approve her nomination. Some say we must also revise our approach to drug control policy, with less emphasis on criminalization of drug use and more emphasis on preventing the negative public health consequences of drug abuse. Uruguay, the United States and other countries are taking the first steps in this direction. Yet to reduce the relative power of organized crime, we must also address the weaknesses of Mexico's criminal justice system noted above. In the end, Guzman's escape shows that there are no shortcuts to improving citizen security and the rule of law in Mexico, and underscores why continued U.S.-Mexico security cooperation is needed, now more than ever. The current crisis offers a newfound opportunity to work together toward that end. - --- MAP posted-by: Jay Bergstrom