Source: Chicago Tribune (IL) Contact: http://www.chicago.tribune.com/ Pubdate: 16 July 1998 Author: Paul de la Garza Section: sec. 1, page 9 SHAKEN BY REBEL GAINS, COLOMBIA TURNS MORE TO THE U.S. TRES ESQUINAS MILITARY BASE, Colombia -- The scene is straight out of Hollywood. A ruggedly handsome, tough-talking general in military fatigues points to maps of coca fields, cocaine labs and guerrilla strongholds in this jungle outpost in southwestern Colombia. The maps are marked "secret" in red marker. As a torrential rain batters the camouflaged tent that houses the general, other members of the nation's military high command and three visiting U.S. Army officers, soldiers along the nearby Orteguaza River stand guard against an enemy they cannot see. After his briefing, Gen. Rafael Hernandez Lopez, 55, leads his guests and his charges on river patrol, and as the military gunboats race along, slapping against the muddy waters of the Orteguaza, the soldiers open fire on the jungle with machine guns mounted on board. The ear-piercing clatter shatters the hot and soggy afternoon along Colombia's most dangerous stretch of territory, about 350 miles southwest of Bogota. Although this exercise is merely for show, the reality is that Colombia is at war, and, according to American intelligence, the enemy is gaining. It was here three months ago, in the region of Caqueta, that the military suffered its worst defeat at the hands of Marxist rebels since the guerrillas took up arms in the mid-1960s. Sixty-seven soldiers were killed. Military analysts worry that because of the burgeoning strength of the rebels, Latin America's oldest democracy could collapse without outside help. "It's a conscript army, badly trained, not particularly well-led," a diplomat said. "Somebody needs to help them." Enter the Clinton administration. Three years ago, the White House began to increase military aid to Colombia. Published reports indicated Washington was reacting to guerrilla advances against the Colombian military. It is of particular concern to the Clinton administration that the ongoing conflict could disrupt oil operations in neighboring Venezuela, America's biggest foreign oil supplier, as well as threaten the nearby Panama Canal. U.S. officials insist that aid was increased to Colombia's military because of the larger role it began to play in the war on drugs. The national police force is responsible for counternarcotics operations in Colombia, but the military often provides protection. So sensitive is the subject that the commander of Colombia's armed forces, Gen. Manuel Jose Bonett, denied the military was getting any help from the U.S., even to help fight the drug war. "We have always fought without the help of the United States," he said. "We are fighting on our own, and I think we will continue that way." According to an American military official who has sat in on briefings in Colombia, the nation's military high command paints a different picture of the war. "We're hearing they need help," he said. "It's a serious problem." Even Bonett admits to having a "direct line" to Miami-based U.S. Gen. Charles Wilhelm, commander of American military forces in Latin America and the Caribbean. He said he talks to Wilhelm almost daily "about things military men talk about." U.S. officials say that funds the military is getting are to be used exclusively to fight the drug war, but they acknowledge that distinguishing between narcotraffickers and leftist guerrillas gets "murky" because of the role the rebels play in the drug trade. "We are not fighting a guerrilla war," a U.S. State Department official said. But "the line does get blurred in the field." Indeed, Gen. Hernandez characterized the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, known by its initials in Spanish as FARC, as "the largest drug cartel in Latin America." U.S. and Colombian officials said the rebels "rent out" their services to drug barons to protect coca and poppy fields and the labs used to process the plants. Critics in Washington, concerned that the U.S. is becoming entangled in another Latin American war, argue that aid proponents have blown the role of the guerrillas in the drug trade out of proportion to justify the shift in U.S. policy. President-elect Andres Pastrana, who takes office Aug. 7, says his top priority is making peace with the rebels. Pastrana met with representatives of the FARC last week at a secret jungle location. Colombia's military is getting about $100 million a year in U.S. aid, an increase of $75 million from three years ago, according to the State Department. Because of the military's history of human rights violations and its close relationship with right-wing death squads, U.S. aid is contingent on the military's human rights performance. A Defense Department document prepared in May outlined some aid to the Colombian military. "The majority of this assistance," it says, "is non-lethal and consists of helicopter spare parts, field and communications gear." The Defense Department says that under a program known as Joint Combined Exchange Training, the U.S. military "has both trained with and has provided military training to the Colombian armed forces, most of it focused on stemming the influence of organized drug trafficking." "We are not providing counterinsurgency training to the Colombian military," the document says. "Nor do we have military advisers in the field." However, the Defense Department document makes the following point: "The skills for counterdrug and counterinsurgency operations sometimes overlap. For example, both include light infantry tactics and weapons training, patrolling, radio communication, and intelligence collection." On average, the number of U.S. military personnel in Colombia totals 193. "Virtually all are providing counternarcotics assistance," the Defense Department says, "although some deployments have taken place to provide counterterrorism training and perform security surveys with regard to the safety of U.S. personnel." According to the Pentagon, Colombia's insurgents, which total about 20,000, probably are the world's best-equipped, best-financed "terrorist force." The rebels rake in an estimated $600 million a year through narcotrafficking, extortion, robbery and kidnapping and control half of Colombian territory. It is estimated that the Colombian drug cartels supply about 80 percent of the cocaine in the U.S. Although Colombia's military outnumbers the guerrillas 6-1, 55,000 of the nation's 125,000 soldiers are committed to protecting Colombian oil fields and other key installations. "We need help . . ." Gen. Hernandez said. "We don't have the support. How can you navigate without a boat? How can you fly without a plane? You saw," he said, referring to an earlier talk with his men, "the soldiers are asking for uniforms." The soldiers also are asking for help. "I want Colombia to know that they have a military, that we want to go forward, that we want to protect democracy," said Sgt. German Morales, 28. "We want support. We are compatriots." - --- Checked-by: Mike Gogulski