Pubdate: Thu, 18 Nov 1999 Source: New York Law Journal (NY) Copyright: 1999 NLP IP Company Contact: 345 Park Avenue South, New York, NY 10010 Fax: (212) 696-4287 Feedback: http://www.nylj.com/contact.html Website: http://www.nylj.com/ Author: John Caher Note: Article is on-line at: http://www.lawnewsnetwork.com/stories/A9827-1999Nov17.html POLICE STOP FOR BIKE INFRACTION LEADS TO VALID DRUG ARREST TROY, N.Y. - Rejecting a defendant's claim of a pretextual stop in violation of the state constitution, an upstate judge has refused to suppress evidence seized from a man initially stopped because he did not have a bell on his bicycle, and subsequently charged with a narcotics felony after a police officer recognized the man as a suspected drug trafficker. Rensselaer County Judge Patrick J. McGrath, in The People of the State of New York v. Claude E. Varn, Indictment No. 98-1176, applied the primary motivation test which New York's courts have continued to rely upon, notwithstanding the U.S. Supreme Court's holding in Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996). Judge McGrath said the "stop of the defendant was clearly justified and the mere fact that the officer subsequent to the stop was aware that defendant was suspected of drug trafficking did not affect the legality of the officer's conduct." The case, which generated substantial interest from defense advocates and civil libertarians upstate, stems from a recent Troy Police Department policy of targeting violators of bicycle safety laws with the goal of stopping more serious crimes committed by persons utilizing bicycles. That policy was implemented in 1995 by Captain Robert Cipperly. Captain Cipperly, while serving as the midnight platoon commander for the Troy Police Department, observed that a substantial amount of street crime - -- including purse snatchings, robberies and assaults -- in the central business district of this small city just north of Albany, was facilitated by the use of bicycles. SAFETY LAWS In late 1995, he ordered all of the officers on the midnight shift to begin enforcing existing bicycle safety laws under both the Vehicle and Traffic Law and the Troy City Code. Eventually, the aggressive enforcement of those laws was extended to all shifts and expanded to the high-crime "combat zone," which generally runs several miles along the Hudson River. The policy was not in effect in other areas of the city. On Sept. 27, 1998, Officer Richard Schoonmaker observed the defendant operating a bicycle on the wrong side of the road and without the audible warning device required under state law and local ordinance. Officer Schoonmaker drove alongside Mr. Varn and, after repeated requests, the bicyclist complied with the officer's request to pull over and stop. Judge McGrath found that it was the officer's intention to issue Mr. Varn a ticket for failing to have a bell and, if the bicyclist had proper identification, release him at the scene. Thereafter, Officer Schoonmaker recognized Mr. Varn as a known drug dealer and possible murder suspect and asked the man to get off the bike. Mr. Varn refused, and when Officer Schoonmaker placed his hands on the handlebars, slapped the officer's hands away. The officer informed Mr. Varn that he was under arrest and grabbed the suspect around the waist. After a struggle, Mr. Varn was taken into custody. A search yielded drugs and Mr. Varn was ultimately charged with harassment, resisting arrest and felony drug possession. MOVE TO SUPPRESS The Rensselaer County Public Defender, Jerome K. Frost, and Gregory D. Cholakis of counsel, moved to suppress based on the argument that the stop of his client was pretextual, and therefore in violation of the New York State Constitution's bar against unreasonable searches and seizures. Mr. Cholakis noted that New York courts have consistently held that police may not exploit a traffic violation as a "mere pretext to stop a citizen," regardless of the Supreme Court's holding in Whren. In Whren, the Supreme Court, in a unanimous 1996 opinion written by Justice Antonin Scalia, held that "subjective intentions play no role in ordinary probable cause Fourth Amendment analysis." The Court interpreted the Fourth Amendment standard of "reasonableness" as being objective, and therefore precluding evaluation of a police officer's subjective motivation. New York courts have held, both pre- and post-Whren, that a traffic violation must be the primary motivation for a stop predicated on those grounds, and consequently a pretextual traffic stop for an investigation into unrelated criminal activity may not be the primary motivation. Mr. Cholakis argued that since the stated purpose of the police department's policy of vigorously enforcing bicycle safety laws was to deter criminal activity, it was inherently pretextual. But Judge McGrath found the policy a "proper exercise of the state's interest in protecting the public from criminal activity," and applying a balancing test, held that the "state interest of making the streets safe for its citizens outweighs the intrusion to the individual." Further, Judge McGrath held that since it was Officer Schoonmaker's usual practice to stop all bicyclists lacking proper equipment, "there is sufficient evidentiary basis for the conclusion that the bicycle violation provided the primary motivation for the stop." Crucial to the judge's ruling was a finding that the officer had not recognized Mr. Varn as a drug dealer until after he had pulled him over for the traffic violation. Mr. Cholakis said he has not yet decided whether to appeal. The prosecution was represented by a special prosecutor, Columbia County District Attorney Beth G. Cozzolino, Timothy J. Berry of counsel. - --- MAP posted-by: Doc-Hawk